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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The last several decades have seen two important changes in the world around us.
First, the role of information in the modern world is by far more important than
in previous days. It is hard to imagine a day when one does not use products
of the informational technology industry. Entire industries nowadays work with
information, and the company with the highest stock value (Microsoft) in the
world is an icon of the informational technology industry. These changes affected
consumers as well. The product universe became much richer and consumers are
each day bombarded by thousands of advertising messages from different firms.
Second, the world is becoming more fast and dynamic, time and intertemporal
considerations play a prominent role nowadays. A large part of recent inventions
are focused on ways to use the available time more efficiently: easier ways of com-
munication, faster transportation, easier housing equipment. This thesis touches
upon certain aspects of these two phenomena.
The first part of the thesis focuses on the role of information in consumer
markets. Information about prices, product characteristics, etc. is costly to
obtain for consumers. Therefore, consumers have to optimize the process of
obtaining this information. Firms, in turn, adjust their behaviour in a particular
way in order to profit form informational imperfections in the market. The first
part of the thesis studies various issues of optimal customer behaviour as well as
1
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optimal behaviour of firms in the case when there are some informational frictions
in the market.
The second part of the thesis considers the role of time and dynamics for the
functioning of different markets. In markets with free competition, intertemporal
relations can be important for a firm’s decision whom to compete against in
order to influence the balance of powers in the industry. In service markets with
regulated prices, different processing times can play a crucial role in an agent’s
decisions to accept or reject customers or be a reason for a moral hazard problem.
These issues are covered in the second part of the thesis.
1.2 Consumer Search
The first part of the thesis deals with various issues of consumer search. The
main focus of the consumer search literature is how market outcomes are af-
fected by informational frictions, i.e. by the fact that consumers have to incur
some costs to get information about products, prices or qualities. The consumer
search literature started with the seminal paper “Economics of information” by
Stigler (1961). In the seventies and eighties the main focus of the consumer
search literature was on consumer (or, more generally, search) behavior. Many
important papers emerged during that time, like Kohn and Shavell (1974), Karni
and Schwartz (1977), Weitzman (1979) and Morgan and Manning (1985). How-
ever, all the aforementioned literature focuses exclusively on the optimal search
behaviour. Chapters 2 and 5 further develop this approach.
The impact of informational frictions on market outcomes was not analyzed
in detail till the late 70s or early 80s. Classical economic theory predicts that
in an ideal world all goods should be sold at the same price. This is the so-
called “Law of one price”. Since this phenomenon is rarely observed in reality,
economists tried to model price dispersion in various ways. Reinganum (1979)
presented one model of price dispersion. Price dispersion in this model arises
from two sources: (i) consumers are uninformed and have to search for prices
and (ii) there is a heterogeneity in firms cost levels. Varian (1980) analysed how
heterogeneity in the degree of consumers’ information can influence the market
outcome. The main result of the paper is the explanation of the phenomenon of
2
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the price dispersion. The crucial difference with the model by Reinganum (1979)
is that price dispersion is observed even in the case when firms are completely
symmetric. However, in Varian’s model consumers are not able to search for
price quotations. The first author who incorporated sequential consumer search
in a model of oligopolistic competition was Stahl (1989). This celebrated paper
has had a large impact on the consumer search literature in general and on this
thesis in particular. Chapter 3 studies the implication of costly second visits on
oligopolistic market outcomes using an approach similar to Stahl (1989). Chapter
4 provides an analysis of minimum price guarantees in a similar framework.
Chapter 2 is based on Janssen and Parakhonyak (2008a). This chapter studies
the implication of the introduction of a costly second visits (costly recall) assump-
tion on the optimal consumer search rules. Most of the consumer search literature
makes the explicit or implicit assumption that consumers can costlessly return to
the firms already sampled. We consider this assumption to be in contradiction
with the philosophy of the consumer search literature, which has informational
frictions at its core. Consider yourself buying, say, shoes. You have found a par-
ticular model which satisfies you, but you think that the price is a bit too high
and decide to go to another store. In that store you might find exactly the same
shoes, but at a price which is slightly higher than in the first store. Is it optimal
for you to return? If the first store is nearby, probably yes, but if it involves quite
a trip, you would probably pay a slightly higher price to avoid the trip back.
In this chapter we propose a model which explicitly takes the costs of go-
ing back into account. This assumption drastically changes the optimal search
rule. The consumer’s behaviour is no longer described by a unique number – the
reservation price. In contrast, the reservation price here (i) depends on the num-
ber of firms left in the sample, and (ii) depends on the search history (the best
price found so far). We show that consumers accept higher prices in the latter
rounds of search, i.e. when the number of firms that are not visited yet decreases.
We also show that the reservation price is a non-decreasing function of the best
price searched. Thus, the optimal search rule implies that prices rejected in the
first round of search might be acceptable in the subsequent rounds. A notable
property of the optimal search rule is that the consumers never come back to a
sampled store till they learn all the prices in the market.
3
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Because most of the equilibrium analysis in the consumer search literature
(eg. Stahl (1989), Stahl (1996), Guimaraes (1996), Janssen et al. (2004), Janssen
and Non (2008)) is entirely based on the assumption of a unique reservation price,
the results of this chapter have important consequences for further research.
In Chapter 3 we analyse consequences of costly second visits on equilibrium
market outcomes. We use an oligopolistic competition setup introduced by Stahl
(1989) and change the assumption about consumer behaviour. In this setup,
the assumption of costly second visits has the potential to drastically change
the equilibrium outcome. In the original model, firms charge prices up to the
reservation price. The reason is that if they were to play a strategy which includes
prices above the reservation price, then the profits at the upper bound of the
support must equal 0. That is because both informed and uninformed consumers
(who continue to search) will find the lower price with probability one. However,
the situation changes with the introduction of costly second visits. In this case
the firm might get some positive profits at the upper bound if it is the last firm
consumers visit. The reason is that consumers might not want to go back because
of the costs, i.e. when the difference between the current and previous offers is
sufficiently small.
First, we show that the equilibrium when all firms charge prices up to the
reservation price with perfect recall is still an equilibrium with costly second
visits. This result is not of particular surprise since if consumers stop at the
first store, the recall costs should not matter. Second, we show this is a unique
symmetric equilibrium of the model. This result is rather surprising. The driving
force for this result is that the upper bound of the support is anyway bounded
from above due to the structure of the profit function. It appears that firms
cannot be sufficiently compensated for losses in demand by charging higher prices.
This result justifies implementing the perfect recall assumption in the oligopolistic
competition model by Stahl (1989), but it might not be the case for other industry
setups.
Chapter 4 is based on Janssen and Parakhonyak (2009). This chapter analy-
ses minimum price guarantees (MPGs), an important strategy tool firms use in
consumer markets. MPGs nowadays are widely used in various industries and are
4
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subject to close study both from scholars and antitrust authorities. In the mod-
ern literature, MPGs are considered to be anticompetitive. Salop (1986) argued
that MPGs work as trigger strategies to sustain collusive outcomes. Empirical
research by Arbatskaya et al. (2004) confirmed that for firms which offer MPGs
(price-matching), prices are higher.
In this chapter we analyse the phenomenon of MPGs using a conventional
sequential consumer search framework developed by Stahl (1989). We concentrate
on the case when MPGs are not preannounced, i.e. the fact whether MPGs are
set or not is revealed simultaneously with the price observation. The main part
of the chapter focuses on price-matching strategies. We show that due to a free-
rider problem, it is not possible that all firms set MPGs for sure. There are
two equilibria in the model: when MPGs are never set, and when MPGs are
played with a certain positive probability. The latter exists only if there is a
sufficiently high level of consumer interaction which translates into a relatively
high chance of exercising MPGs. The equilibrium with MPGs is characterized
by two notable properties. First, firms which set MPGs set strictly higher prices
than firms who do not. Second, even the firms which do not set MPGs in a
particular realization of (mixed) equilibrium strategy sell at higher prices than in
the equilibrium when MPGs are never set. This result has important implications
for empirical research. We also show that price-beating is never optimal due to
the free-rider problem. All the results predict similar outcomes as observed by
Arbatskaya et al. (2004).
Chapter 5 is based on Parakhonyak (2009). This chapter does not consider
equilibrium behaviour but as Chapter 2 concentrates on developing the optimal
search rule for a searcher (consumer). The novelty of this model is that it concen-
trates on investigating a particular object’s properties and their interdependence.
Consider yourself buying a sophisticated product: a laptop, a camera, etc. Most
of the time a consumer spends is on figuring out different characteristics of the
product, not just the price. Moreover, the price is usually easily accessible, but
other characteristics might be hidden quite deeply and are costly to uncover.
This justifies, for example, the existence of various product reviewing magazines.
The same idea holds for investment decisions, when the investments are roughly
known but different parameters of the final product (quality of oil and reserves,
5
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demand for new products and costs) are unknown, but can be fairly easily es-
timated based on (costly) research. We show that objects which are ex ante
identical in terms of expected utility and risk might be evaluated very differently
given the possibility of investigating the attributes. Asymmetry in the proba-
bility distribution over the characteristics, which is seemingly irrelevant, plays
an important role in consumer behaviour. The optimal search rule is such that
the searcher first observes an attribute which is least likely to take an acceptable
value. We show that sometimes a sufficiently high level of asymmetry can induce
search, which is not observed when the attributes are (almost) symmetric. The
model is first developed for the investigation of one object and then generalized
for the case of multiple objects.
1.3 Dynamic Competition and Regulation
Time plays a crucial role in our life and affects most of our decisions. However,
time and dynamics have not attained as much attention in microeconomics as for
example in macro. This part of the thesis focuses on two problems with dynamics
at their core.
Chapter 6 is based on Dubovik and Parakhonyak (2009). We consider a
dynamic (differential) game with three players competing against each other. In
each period, each player can allocate his resources so as to direct his competition
towards particular rivals, i.e. “target” them. This differentiates our model from
the classical models of oligopolistic competition, such as Bertrand and Cournot.
In these models firms compete against all their rivals equally. In this sense, this
chapter has similarities with colonel Blotto games (see, e.g., Roberson, 2006) and
truel games (Kilgour (1971)). Our setting can be applied to a wide variety of
cases: competition between firms, competition between political parties, warfare.
The key feature of targeted competition is that the power of the players
changes with time based upon their actions. This brings an important strategic
considerations into the game: players might want to target particular opponents
and reduce the level of competition with others in order to influence the balance
of powers. We show that if the players are myopic, the weaker players eventually
6
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lose the game to their strongest rival. Vice versa, if the players value their fu-
ture payoffs high enough, each player concentrates more on fighting his strongest
opponent. Consequently, the weaker players grow stronger, the strongest player
grows weaker and eventually all the players converge and remain in the game.
Chapter 7 is based on Janssen and Parakhonyak (2008b). In this chapter we
analyse markets which possess the following crucial properties. First, consumers
arrive sequentially to demand some service and come in different treatment times
or “complexities”. Second, the fare structure (how price depends on treatment
time or “complexity”) is fixed by a regulating authority or central company man-
agement. Third, agents who actually provide the service can either accept or
reject customers based on the comparison of benefits and costs. Examples of
markets which have the aforementioned features are: taxi markets, doctors’ ser-
vices, some repair markets. These markets quite often are characterized either
by selection, or by demand inducement. For example, a taxi driver can reject
a customer for a short trip (selection) or take a longer route to the destination
(demand inducement). In a similar way, medical service markets are quite of-
ten characterized by demand inducement (see, for example, McGuire and Pauly
(1991)).
We argue that these phenomena exist due to the disparity between monetary
payments (net of material costs) and treatment times of the clients. We show
that for a large class of price structures, some group of customers is refused
the service. Equilibria with selection are welfare inferior to equilibria without
selection. We also characterize the class of price structures for which selection
does not arise. As the number of customers increases or agents become more
patient, the class of selection-free price structures shrinks and in the limit it is
unique. We show that this unique fare structure not only avoids the selection
problem, but also eliminates demand inducement. The results of this chapter can
be directly applied to policy-making decisions in regulated markets.
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Consumer Search
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Chapter 2
Consumer search with costly
second visits
2.1 Introduction
The main focus of consumer search theory is to analyze how market outcomes
are affected if the cost consumers have to make to get information about the
prices and/or qualities firms offer is explicitly taken into account. One of the
basic results of the extensive literature is that firms have some market power
that they can exploit even if there are many firms in the market and that price
dispersion emerges as a consequence of the fact that some firms aim at selling
to many consumers at low prices, while others make higher margins over fewer
customers (see, e.g., Stigler (1961) and Reinganum (1979)).
Most, if not all, of the consumer literature makes implicitly or explicitly the as-
sumption of perfect or free recall: consumers can always come back to previously
sampled firms without making a cost.1 One of the important consequences of this
assumption is that consumer search behavior is characterized by one reservation
price that is constant over time (Kohn and Shavell (1974)): for any observed price
sequence, consumers stop searching and buy at the firm from which they received
1See, e.g., Reinganum (1979), Morgan and Manning (1985) , Stahl (1989) and Stahl (1996)
for early papers and Janssen et al. (2005), Tse (2006) and Waldeck (2008) for more recent
papers explicitly using the perfect recall assumption.
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a price quote if that price is not larger than this reservation price; otherwise they
continue searching.1
The assumption of perfect recall is, so we argue, at odds with the general
philosophy of the consumer search literature which has search frictions at its
core. If consumers have to make a cost to go to a shop in the first place, then
in almost any natural environment it also costly (in terms of time, effort, or
money) to go back to that shop. Even while searching on the internet, where the
costs of search are arguably lower than in nonelectronic markets, it takes some
mouse clicks and time to go back to previously visited websites. In other words,
in consumer search it is not only important to remember the offers previously
received, but one also has to make a cost to activate these offers again.
In this chapter we replace the perfect recall assumption by the more natural
assumption of costly second visits, where the cost of going back to stores previ-
ously sampled is explicitly modelled. Under costly second visits, we show that
consumer search is no longer characterized by a reservation price that is constant
over time. Instead, the reservation price at any moment in time depends on (i)
the number of firms that are not yet sampled and (ii) the lowest price sampled so
far. In particular, for a given lowest price in the sample the reservation price is
(weakly) decreasing in the number of firms that are not yet sampled (increasing
over time) and increasing in the minimum price in the sample if this minimum
price is not too large. Of course, if no prices are sampled yet, the reservation price
is just a constant (depending on the number of firms that quote prices). Only
when there are infinitely many prices to sample, stationarity re-appears and the
reservation price in that case coincides with the reservation price under perfect
recall.
These two differences in the characterization of reservation prices have im-
portant consequences for the actual search behaviour of consumers. Under costly
second visits it may very well happen that if consumers observe as part of a price
sequence two prices pt and pt+1, with pt < pt+1, they will rationally decide to
accept to buy at pt+1 and not at pt. This behaviour is not possible under perfect
1An alternative setting is studied by Weitzman (1979). He considers the interesting case
where alternatives differ in the cost of inspection as well as in the distribution of revenues and
he asks the question in which order the alternatives should be explored.
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recall and rational consumer behaviour. The main reason for the fact that dif-
ferent behaviours are possible is that under costly second visits, no matter how
small the cost of retrieving previously sampled information, the search process
is no longer stationary. In addition, the fewer the number of firms not yet sam-
pled, the worse the chance of observing a low price if one continues searching.
Together, this implies that the class of search behaviours that are consistent with
rational behaviour on the part of consumers becomes much richer. Obviously,
this has important consequences for the literature studying firm behaviour when
consumers search sequentially as this literature is entirely based on the idea of a
constant reservation price that is represented as a fixed number.1
In contrast to the assumption of perfect recall commonly employed in the
literature on consumer search, many papers in the literature on job search assume
that only current offers can be accepted as previous offers that are not accepted
are foregone. Karni and Schwartz (1977) have interpreted these two applications
of search theory as making specific assumptions on the probability with which past
observations can be successfully retrieved: in consumer search, the probability of
successful retrieval is one, in job market search, this probability is zero. They
then go on to study situations with ”uncertain recall”, where the probability that
past observations can be successfully retrieved is less than one but greater than
zero (see also Landsberger and Peleg (1977)). We interpret the difference between
consumer search and job market search differently, namely in terms of the cost
one has to make to retrieve information. This cost is either zero or prohibitively
high. We study the intermediate case where the cost is positive, but not too
high to make it uninteresting to consider the option of going back to previously
sampled firms.2
1An extensive overview of this literature has recently been given by Baye et al. (2006).
2As far as we are aware, there is no paper studying this most relevant case. Kohn and
Shavell (1974) say that some of their results continue to hold if there is no possibility of recall,
but they also do not analyze the situation of costly recall. Some of the results of Landsberger
and Peleg (1977) are similar in nature to ours. Most notably that for every search there is a
time-dependent reservation price and that this price is constant in case of perfect recall and
infinitely many firms. In the operations research literature Kang (1999) studies an optimal
stopping problem where the cost of a second visit is a percentage of the utility derived from
previous observations and arrives at a technical analysis that resembles our analysis of the
13
2. CONSUMER SEARCH WITH COSTLY SECOND VISITS
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic framework of analysis. Section 3 analyzes the optimal search behavior
of consumers and Section 4 presents an example illustrating the nonstationarity
and the the fact that rational consumers may decide to buy later at higher prices.
Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Framework of Analysis
Consumers are confronted with the following situation. There are N firms selling
some product. Each firm makes a specific price-quality offering that can be ranked
according to some one-dimensional criterion, denoted by p. For simplicity, one
may think of this ranking in terms of price: consumers prefer to buy the good
with the lowest price. Each firm chooses a p according to some continuous
mixed strategy distribution F (p) with support [p, p]. Each consumer has a unit
demand and valuation v for the product. Consumers have search costs c – the
price they are paying for visiting a store. Costly second visits are modeled by
saying that consumers have a cost b of returning back to a store already visited,
with 0 ≤ b ≤ c. Consumers sequentially sample the prices chosen by firms.
Consumers first have to decide whether or not to search, and after the first and
each subsequent price offer, whether they want to obtain one more price quote or
whether to stop searching, and if they decide to stop searching whether to buy at
all and if so whether to buy at the current price or at previously sampled prices.
The main issue we are interested in is how the presence of costly second visits
(b > 0) affects the optimal search rule.1
optimal search rule. See Section 3 for a more detailed comparison.
1In later research (see Chapter 3) we intend to investigate this search rule in the context of
a specific search model where also the behaviour of firms is explicitly modeled. We do not do
that in the context of the present chapter as we do not want to mix the very general context in
which we analyze the optimal search rule with a specific model of price setting in the market.
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2.3 Optimal Consumer Search
We start the analysis by considering the optimal stopping rule for consumers.
Before searching once, consumers compare the benefits and cost of a first price
search, and if the expected benefits exceed cost, which is, if
v −
v∫
p
pdF (p)− c ≥ 0 (2.3.1)
consumers will search (at least) once. This is a sufficient condition for search-
ing once. Integrating by parts, this (first-step) condition can be rewritten as
follows:
v∫
p
F (p)dp ≥ c. (2.3.2)
If F (p) satisfies this first-step condition (2.3.2)1 we can analyze whether the
consumer decides to continue searching or not after having observed a first price.
Since the expected value of continuing to search depends on future period
expected values we use backward induction to analyze the optimal stopping rule.
To this end, define psk−1 as the smallest price in a sample of k−1 prices previously
sampled. We will argue that for each value of psk−1 there is a unique value of pk
such that an individual consumer is indifferent between buying at pk and either
going back to one of the previously sampled firms and buying there or continue
searching. We denote this price by ρk(p
s
k−1). If pk ≤ ρk(psk−1), the consumer
decides to buy at pk. Otherwise, he either buys at p
s
k−1 (if this price is relatively
small) or continues to search.
The proof is by induction starting at the last firm. The following lemma
introduces the base of induction.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let F (p) be a distribution of prices. Then for k = N − 1 the
reservation price ρN−1 is uniquely defined as a function of psN−2 ∈ [p, p] by
1Alternatively, we may follow Stahl (1989) and assume that the first price quotation is
given for free.
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ρN−1(psN−2) = min
(
psN−2 + b, c+ p
s
N−2 + b−
∫ psN−2+b
p
F (p)dp, p∗N−1
)
where p∗N−1 satisfies the equation
p∗N−1 = c+ E(pN |pN < p∗N−1 + b)F (p∗N−1 + b) + (1− F (p∗N−1 + b))(p∗N−1 + b).
Moreover, if the consumer decides to continue searching, the continuation
cost of search, defined as the additional net expected cost of continuing to search
conditional on optimal behaviour after the search is made, is given by
CN−1(psN−1) = c+ p
s
N−1 + b−
∫ psN−1+b
p
F (p)dp.
Proof. We consider the situation where N − 2 firms have been sampled and the
consumer has decided to make one more search. In this case, the consumer has
three options: to buy now at the newly observed price pN−1, to buy now at
lowest price among the previously sampled prices psN−2, or to continue searching.
Knowing the value of min(pN−1, psN−2), the last option gives an expected value of
v − c− E(pN |pN < min((pN−1, psN−2) + b)F (min(pN−1, psN−2) + b)−
(1− F (min(pN−1, psN−2) + b))(min(pN−1, psN−2) + b).
Let us first concentrate on the case where pN−1 ≥ psN−2. In this case the pay-off
of continuing to search does not depend on pN−1 so that the reservation price is
given by the point where the consumer is either (i) indifferent between buying
now at pN−1 or buying at psN−2 (and paying the additional cost of going back
b) or (ii) indifferent between buying now at pN−1 and continue searching. In the
first case ρN−1(psN−2) = p
s
N−2 + b; in the second case
ρN−1(psN−2) = c+ E(pN |pN < psN−2 + b)F (psN−2 + b) +
+ (1− F (psN−2 + b))(psN−2 + b) =
= c+
∫ psN−2+b
p
pdF (p) + (1− F (psN−2 + b))(psN−2 + b) =
= c+ psN−2 + b−
∫ psN−2+b
p
F (p)dp.
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It is easily seen that the first-order derivative of this expression w.r.t. psN−2 is
positive and strictly smaller than 1. Moreover, it is easily seen that at psN−2 = p,
this expression equals psN−2+ c > p
s
N−2+ b. Hence, by continuity, for small values
of psN−2 the reservation price is given by ρN−1(p
s
N−2) = p
s
N−2+b. For larger values
of psN−2 it is ρN−1(p
s
N−2) = c+p
s
N−2+b−
∫ psN−2+b
p
F (p)dp, at least when ρN−1(psN−2)
is still larger than psN−2.
Let us next concentrate on the case where pN−1 ≤ psN−2. In this case the
consumer will never go back to previously sampled prices and thus the reservation
price is implicitly characterized by the price that solves
pN−1 = c+ E(pN |pN < pN−1 + b)F (pN−1 + b) + (1− F (pN−1 + b))(pN−1 + b).
Because of continuity at pN−1 = psN−2, the fact that when p
s
N−2 < ρN−1(p
s
N−2) <
psN−2+ b, the derivative of the reservation price is strictly smaller than 1, and the
fact that left differentiability holds at pN−1 = psN−2, we should have that there is
exactly one pN−1 that solves the above equation. This implies that in the region
where pN−1 ≤ psN−2, ρN−1(psN−2) is independent of psN−2. Thus, also in this case
ρN−1(psN−2) is uniquely defined and non-decreasing in p
s
N−2.
Once price pN−1 is observed the continuation costs of search are defined by
CN−1(psN−1) = c+ E(pN |pN < psN−1 + b)F (psN−1 + b) +
+ (1− F (psN−1 + b))(psN−1 + b) =
= c+
∫ psN−1+b
p
pdF (p) + (1− F (psN−1 + b))(psN−1 + b) =
= c+ psN−1 + b−
∫ psN−1+b
p
F (p)dp.
The following picture illustrates the lemma.
The reservation price as a function of psN−2 is presented by the bold curves.
It is easy to see that this line consists of three parts:
• for psN−2 < p˜ the best alternative to buying at pN−1 is to go back to the
lowest-priced firm in the sample so far. Thus, the reservation price is de-
termined by ρN−1 = psN−2 + b.
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Figure 2.1: Reservation Price ρN−1 as a function of psN−2
psN−2
pN−1
CN−1
p∗N−1p˜
b
A
B
C
• for p˜ ≤ psN−2 < p∗N−1 the option to continue searching is always preferred
to the option of going back to the lowest-priced firm in the sample so far.
Thus, the consumer’s optimal choice is based on a comparison between the
current price and the expected continuation costs of continuing to search;
• for the region psN−2 ≥ p∗N−1 the situation is similar to the previous case,
except that the current price is always the lowest price in the sample so far,
implying that the continuation cost does not depend on psN−2. Therefore,
the reservation price is independent of psN−2 in this case.
Along the bold curve the consumer is indifferent between buying now at the
shop he is currently visiting or either continuing to search or to go back to the
lowest-priced firm in the sample so far.
Since optimal search behaviour is completely determined by the pair (pN−1, psN−2)
we can characterize it in the same figure. Indeed,
• in region A which is bounded from below by ρN−1 and from the right by
p˜, the consumer always goes back and buys at the lowest-priced firm in the
sample so far;
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• in region B which is bounded from above by the reservation price, the
consumer always buys at the current shop;
• finally in region C, which is bounded from below by reservation price and
for which psN−2 > p˜, the consumer always continues to search.
Now we show that on any step 1 < k < N − 1 the reservation price as a
function of the lowest price in the sample is uniquely defined and has essentially
the same shape as in Figure 2.1. The proof is by induction. Before we give the
formal statement of the result and the proof, we have to provide a technical result
that turns out to be useful in making the induction step. To this end, assume
that y is a random variable with a continuous distribution function F (y). Let for
a given search and return cost c and b, the following function be defined
C∗(x) = P(y < min(x+ b, C(min(x, y))))·
· E(y|y < min(x+ b, C(min(x, y))))+
+ P(y ≥ min(x+ b, C(min(x, y))))·
· E(min(x+ b, C(min(x, y)))|y > min(x+ b, C(min(x, y)))) + c.
. (2.3.3)
The function C∗(x) can be interpreted as a generalized continuation cost of ad-
ditional search given continuation cost on the next step.
For any function f(x) let us define
f−(x) = lim inf
∆x→0
f(x+∆x)− f(x)
∆x
f+(x) = lim sup
∆x→0
f(x+∆x)− f(x)
∆x
Then the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2.3.2. If C(z) is a continuous function and for any z in he support of
F (·) 0 ≤ C−(z) ≤ C+(z) < 1 and C(y) > b, where y is the lower bound of the
support of F (y), then C∗(x) is a continuous function and for any x in the support
of F (·) except the lower bound, 0 ≤ C∗−(x) ≤ C∗+(x) < 1.
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Proof. Continuity follows immediately from the definition of C∗.
Consider the following inequality: y < min(x+b, C(min(x, y))). Since C+(z) <
1, this inequality can be rewritten in the form y < g(x) = min(x + b, C(x), a),
where a satisfies equation a = C(a). It is clear that g+(x) ≤ 1.
Thus, we can rewrite C∗ in the following form:
C∗(x) = P(y < g(x))E[y|y < g(x)]+
+ P(y ≥ g(x))E[min(x+ b, C(min(x, y)))|y ≥ g(x)] + c
Now note, that if x ≤ a then given that y ≥ g(x) we get min(x+b, C(min(x, y)) =
min(x+ b, C(x)) which is just g(x) for x < a. Then we get
C∗(x) = P(y < g(x))E[y|y < g(x)] + P(y ≥ g(x))E[g(x)|y ≥ g(x)] + c
and therefore
C∗+(x) =
(
F (g(x))
F (g(x))
∫ g(x)
y
yf(y)dy + (1− F (g(x)))g(x)
)+
=
= [g(x)f(g(x)) + (1− F (g(x)))− g(x)f(g(x))] g+(x) = [1− F (g(x))]g+(x) < 1.
with the second equality coming from continuity of g(x). It is also clear that
C∗− ≥ 0.
Another case is if x > a. Here, given y ≥ g(x)we get min(x+b, C(min(x, y)) =
C(min(x, y)). Then we get
C∗(x) = P(y < g(x))E[y|y < g(x)] + P(y ≥ g(x))E[C(min(x, y))|y ≥ g(x)] + c
Or
C∗(x) =
∫ g(x)
y
yf(y)dy +
∫ x
g(x)
C(y)f(y)d(y) +
∫ ∞
x
C(x)f(y)d(y) + c
Now, because of continuity of g(x) and C(x) again we get
C∗+(x) = [g(x)f(g(x))− C(g(x))f(g(x))]g+(x) + C+(x)(1− F (x))
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Now note, that for x > a we have g(x) = a and therefore C(g(x)) = a. Thus,
C∗+ = C+(x)(1− F (x)) < 1
In the same way
C∗− = C−(x)(1− F (x)) < 1
which completes the proof since C−(x) ≥ 0, 1− F (x) ≥ 0.
Given these two lemmas, we are now ready to state and prove the main result
of the chapter. The result says that the reservation price as a function of psk−1
is well-defined and unique and a monotone function of psk−1. In later results, we
prove that the time- and history-dependency of these reservation prices cannot
be neglected, unlike the case of costless recall.
Theorem 2.3.3. The reservation price ρk(p
s
k−1) is uniquely defined for any k and
any psk−1 from the support of F (p). Moreover, the time- and history-dependent
reservation prices ρk(p
s
k−1) are nondecreasing in p
s
k−1.
Proof. Let Ck(p
s
k) be a continuation cost of additional search on the k-th step
given realizations of (psk−1, pk) (recall that p
s
k = min(p
s
k−1, pk)). Then, given the
optimal search behaviour of the consumer, Ck(p
s
k) is the expected payoff of two
events: either the consumer buys at the next firm to be searched (first event) or
he continues to search onwards or goes back (second event). Thus, we get that
Ck(p
s
k) = c+ P(pk+1 < min(psk + b, Ck+1(psk+1)))·
· E(pk+1|pk+1 < min(psk + b, Ck+1(psk+1)))+
+ P(pk+1 ≥ min(psk + b, Ck+1(psk+1)))·
· E(min(psk + b, Ck+1(psk+1))|pk+1 ≥ min(psk + b, Ck+1(psk+1)))
.
We prove that 0 ≤ C−k (psk) ≤ C+k (psk) < 1. The proof is by backward induction.
From lemma 2.3.1 it is easy to see that 0 ≤ C−N−1(psN−1) ≤ C+N−1(psN−1) < 1,
thus the base of induction is proven. We will now argue that this property also
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holds for any other period. For proving the induction step we can apply lemma
2.3.2 by substituting in the equation (2.3.3) x = psk, y = pk+1, C
∗(x) = Ck(psk),
C(min(x, y)) = Ck+1(p
s
k+1). Therefore, from 0 ≤ C−k+1(psk+1) ≤ C+k+1(psk+1) < 1 it
follows that 0 ≤ C−k (psk) ≤ C+k (psk) < 1 and thus, by induction it follows that for
any k 0 ≤ C−k (psk) ≤ C+k (psk) < 1.
The rest of the proof is straightforward. If pk ≥ psk−1, then ρk(psk−1) =
min(psk−1 + b, Ck(p
s
k−1)), which is well-defined and unique. Moreover, it is non-
decreasing in psk−1 since both p
s
k−1 + b and Ck(p
s
k) are non-decreasing in p
s
k−1.
If, on the other hand, pk < p
s
k−1, then the reservation price is a solution to the
equation pk = Ck(pk), which is unique since Ck(pk) has a slope strictly smaller
than 1. In this case, the reservation price does not depend on psk−1 and is thus
nondecreasing in psk−1.
The proof of the theorem basically shows that the function ρk+1(p
s
k) is defined
over three separate intervals and essentially looks like the reservation price for
the last step (see Figure 2.1). When psk−1 is relatively small ρk(p
s
k−1) = p
s
k−1 + b.
Then for intermediate values of psk−1, ρk(p
s
k−1) = Ck(p
s
k−1) and for higher values
ρk(p
s
k−1) is independent of p
s
k−1. One can thus, define the price p˜k as the price
such that the consumer is indifferent between going back to the shop charging
this price and continuing to search, i.e., p˜k + b = Ck(p˜k).
We are now in the position to prove some special properties of the reservation
price function. To this end, define ρpr as the reservation price under perfect recall,
i.e., as noted, e.g., by Stahl (1989),
c =
∫ ρpr
p
F (p)dp.
By considering the limiting case where the cost of recall is zero we provide more
insight into the reason why the cases of perfect recall and costly second visits
are so different from one another. Moreover, the reservation price under perfect
recall turns out to play an important role in further characterizing the optimal
search behaviour under costly second visits.
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Proposition 2.3.4. 1 Let b = 0. Then for any k the reservation price is defined
by:
ρk = min(p
s
k−1, ρ
pr).
Under perfect recall, the search rule is stationary, but (interestingly) slightly
different from what is commonly thought as in any period the reservation price
is still dependent on the lowest of previously sampled prices. When the current
price is smaller than any of the previously sampled prices, then the consumer
simply compares the current price with ρpr and decides whether or not to buy. If
the current price is larger, the consumer simply forgets about the current price.
Because of stationarity, previously sampled prices are in a full model including
price setting behaviour of the firms, irrelevant. Either these previously sampled
prices are below ρpr, but then the consumer simply does not continue to search,
or they are above ρpr, but then the consumer never considers buying there unless
he has visited all the stores and knows for sure that there are no lower prices in
the sample.2
To further characterize the optimal search rule, under costly second visits we
show that the price p˜k is intimately related to the price ρ
pr under perfect recall.
Proposition 2.3.5. For all k, p˜k = p˜ = ρ
pr − b .
Proof. Note that the price p˜k is defined such that after visiting k stores, the
consumer is indifferent between continuing searching and going back to the lowest-
priced store in the sample so far. Therefore, at p˜k the reservation price ρk(p˜k) =
p˜k + b. The expected costs of continuing to search are:
c+ F (p˜k + b)E(pk+1|pk+1 < p˜k + b) + (1− F (p˜k + b))(p˜k + b)
By equating it to the best current option (p˜k+ b) and some simplifications we
have also used in previous proofs, we get
c =
∫ p˜k+b
p
F (p)dp.
1As this fact is intuitively obvious the proof is available upon request.
2However, in equilibrium even this could not be the case with b = 0 as then the traditional
argument kicks in that no firm wants to charge the highest price above ρpr as no consumer will
ever buy at this price, implying that no firm will want to choose a price above ρpr.
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It follows therefore that p˜k does not depend on k and that (by comparing this
equation to the definition of ρpr) it is actually just equal to ρpr − b.
Next, we show that rational consumers never use the option of going back to
previously sampled stores, unless they have visited every store available.
Corollary 2.3.6. Assume the consumer behaved optimally on all steps 1 ≤ k ≤
K. Then if K < N, it is never optimal for this consumer to go back.
Proof. Note, that the option of going back is preferred to continue searching or
stopping only if psK < p˜. On the first step any price p1 ≤ ρpr would be accepted
immediately. So, if the consumer continued his search it must be the case that
p1 > ρ
pr. Given ps1 > ρ
pr on the second step any price p2 ≤ ρpr also would be
accepted immediately. Thus, if consumer continued his search it must be the case
that p2 > ρ
pr. Then by induction if customer reached step K it must be the case
that for any 1 ≤ k ≤ K it was the case that pk > ρpr. Therefore psK > ρpr > p˜
and it is never optimal to go back, except possibly at the last step.
Next, we show that reservation prices are non-decreasing over time. In partic-
ular, if a price smaller than p˜ = ρpr−b is sampled before, then the reservation price
is simply ρk(p
s
k−1) = p
s
k−1+b and therefore if p
s
k = p
s
k−1, then ρk+1(p
s
k) = ρk(p
s
k−1).
However, if a price strictly larger than p˜ = ρpr − b is the lowest price in the sam-
ple so far, then ρk+1(p
s
k) > ρk(p
s
k−1). Thus, under costly second visits reservation
prices are essentially nonstationary.
Proposition 2.3.7. If psk = p
s
k−1, then ρk+1(p
s
k) ≥ ρk(psk−1), i.e., reservation
prices are non-decreasing over time. Moreover, ρk+1(p
s
k) > ρk(p
s
k−1) for all p
s
k
and psk−1 such that p
s
k = p
s
k−1 > p˜ = ρ
pr − b .
Proof. Note, that the reservation price essentially represents the cost of the next-
best available alternative to buying now at the shop the consumer is currently
visiting. If the next-best available alternative is to go back to the lowest-priced
firm in the sample before visiting this shop, i.e., psk−1 < p˜ the reservation price is
simply independent of the periods, i.e., ρk+1(p
s
k−1) = ρk(p
s
k−1) = p
s
k−1 + b.
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Now consider the case where the next-best available alternative is to continue
searching. Let {ρk(psk−1)}Nk=1 be the sequence of the reservation price functions.
Consider the following suboptimal strategy. If on step k the consumer makes a
decision to visit one more firm he either buys at the firm he visits at step k+1 or
continues his search but forgets about this firm later on (thus, he never comes back
to that firm). Let us denote a reservation price under this suboptimal strategy
by ρ′k(p
s
k−1). Then ρk(p
s
k−1) ≤ ρ′k(psk−1). On the other hand for any psk−1 > p˜ we
get
ρ′k(p
s
k−1) = F (ρk+1(p
s
k−1))E(pk+1|pk+1 < ρk+1(psk−1) +
+ (1− F (ρk+1(psk−1)))ρk+1(psk−1) < ρk+1(psk−1)
which completes the proof.
We finally consider the limiting case (of perfect competition) where there are
potentially infinitely many prices to sample. As the time dependency of the reser-
vation prices disappears due to the fact that now the cost of continuing to search
is independent of time, i.e., ρk(p
s
k−1) = ρk+1(p
s
k). For prices below p˜, we knew
already that this equality holds. Interestingly, with infinitely many firms and
previously sampled prices above p˜, the reservation prices becomes independent
of previously sampled prices and equal to the reservation price under perfect re-
call. Thus, the cost of going back to previously sampled firms does not play an
important role under perfect competition.
Proposition 2.3.8. Let K ∈ N. Then for any p ≥ p˜ limN→∞ ρK(p) = ρpr.
Proof. Note, that for any p ≥ p˜, CN−1(p) is fixed and does not depend on N . On
the other hand for any p ≥ p˜ we have
Ck(p) = F (ρk+1(p))E(pk+1|pk+1 < ρk+1(p)) +
+ (1− F (ρk+1(p))E(Ck+1(pk+1)|pk+1 ≥ ρk+1(p)) ≤
≤ C ′k(p) = F (ρk+1(p))E(pk+1|pk+1 < ρk+1(p)) + (1− F (ρk+1(p))ρk+1(p)
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Note, that C ′k(p) can be rewritten in the form:
C ′k(p) = ρk+1(p) + c−
∫ ρk+1(p)
p
F (p)dp
Therefore, following our notation
C
′+
k (p) = ρ
+
k+1(p)(1− F (ρk+1(p))) ≤ C
′+
k+1(p)(1− F (ρk+1(p)))
Then
C
′+
K (p) ≤
N−1∏
i=K
C
′+
i+1(p)(1− F (ρi+1(p)))
As 1−F (ρi+1(p)) < 1 for any p > p˜ and i > K (note, that ρi+1(p) < ρi+2(p)⇒
1− F (ρi+1(p)) > 1− F (ρi+2(p))) we get
lim
N→∞
C
′+
K (p) = 0.
.
Now note that from proposition 3.5 it follows that ρK(p˜) = ρ
pr and therefore
CK(p˜) = ρ
pr. Therefore, since C ′K(p) is a continuous function we get that for any
p ≥ p˜,
lim
N→∞
C ′K(p) = ρ
pr.
Therefore
lim
N→∞
CK(p) = ρ
pr.
Thus, under perfect competition the reservation price under costly second
visits is exactly identical to the case where consumers have perfect recall.
2.4 Example
In the previous section, we have provided a general characterization of the time-
and history-dependency of the reservation price. In this Section we provide an
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example to illustrate the features of these reservation prices. The example clearly
shows that it can be rational to accept a price in a future period even if a lower
price has been observed in the past.
Consider the uniform distribution of prices on [0, 100]. Assume there are 4
firms in the market, search costs c are equal to 5 and the costs of going back
to a previously sampled firm b equals 3. The reservation prices after visiting
no, one and two firms as well as the reservation price under perfect recall are
presented in Figure 2.2. In this case, the reservation price under perfect recall
equals approximately 31.62, while the reservation price before visiting any shop
under costly second visits equals 32.90. Thus, if a consumer faces, say, a price of
33 in the first period he decides to continue searching. From Figure 2 it is clear,
however, that if the third price the consumer encounters is say 34 it is optimal
for him to stop.
Figure 2.2: Simulation Results for Uniform Distribution.
Parameters of simulation: N = 4, a = 100, b = 3, c = 5.
The figure also illustrates most of the results we proved in the previous section.
In particular, it is easy to observe that:
• all reservation price functions are non-decreasing in psk (Theorem 2.3.3);
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• all the reservation price functions have a kink at the same p˜ = ρpr−b ≈ 28.62
(Proposition 2.3.5);
• the sequence of reservation prices is non-decreasing in the number of firms
left, and strictly increasing for all prices above p˜ (Proposition 2.3.7);
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we built a consumer search model where we explicitly model
the cost of going back to stores already searched. We show that in general the
optimal search rule under costly second visits is very different from the optimal
search rule under perfect recall. Under costly second visits, the optimal search
behaviour is nonstationary and, moreover, the reservation price is not indepen-
dent of previously sampled prices. Consequently, it may happen that the optimal
search strategy tells consumers to reject relatively low prices early on in the search
process and accept higher prices later on. Stationarity is obtained only in the
special case of perfect competition where there are infinitely many firms.
Future work should incorporate the optimal search rule under costly second
visits characterized here, in a full consumer search model where the pricing be-
haviour of firms is explicitly modelled. Due to the assumption of costless recall,
consumers in most search models actually do not search very much in any sym-
metric equilibrium. This is because in a symmetric equilibrium where firms set
prices above the reservation price under free recall, the firm charging the highest
price in the market does not make any sales as there is always a firm present with
a lower price and consumers will continue searching until they find this price. So,
no firm would want to charge the highest price above the reservation price and,
therefore, in equilibrium no prices above the reservation price will be charged.
Future research should inquire whether this result continues to hold under costly
second visits. Under costly second visits, it may well be possible that for example
in a duopoly market all firms charging with some positive probability prices above
the reservation price (for the first price observation) is part of an equilibrium as
by doing so these firms still have two potential sources of revenue: (i) from con-
sumers who first searched firm A, next search firm B and want to stop there even
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if B charges higher price than A, due to the costs of going back to firm A and (ii)
from consumers who first search firm A, after that B and go back to firm A if it
had sufficiently lower prices.
We have not analyzed a full model including price setting behaviour of firms
in this chapter as this would require a choice of a specific market set-up. Here, we
have characterized the optimal search rule under costly second visits in a general
form that could be applied to any specific market environment.
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Chapter 3
Costly Second Visits:
Oligopolistic Competition
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we studied the implications of introducing the assump-
tion of costly second visits for consumer search behaviour. We argued that this
assumption is better aligned with the general philosophy of consumer search lit-
erature than the assumption of perfect recall as when consumers have to make a
cost to visit a store in the first place, they typically also have to incur some cost,
possibly somewhat smaller, to execute the purchase at that shop when they have
left the store to first consider other prices elsewhere; often the consumer simply
has to travel back to the shop or to go back to a previously visited website. We
showed that if the assumption of costless second visits (perfect recall) is relaxed to
allow for costly second visits, the consumer’s behaviour changes drastically. The
optimal search rule is no longer characterized by a time-independent stationary
reservation price. the reservation price depends both on the search history and
the number of firms left.
The natural question is how this change in consumer’s search strategies caused
by introduction of costly second visits affects the market equilibrium? Is the as-
sumption of perfect recall crucial for the analysis of search markets? The answer
to these questions depend on the industry setup. In this chapter we use a conven-
tional model of oligopolistic competition with homogeneous goods and sequential
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consumer search, which was pioneered by Stahl (1989), to study the implications
of costly second visits. The distinguishing feature of the Stahl model is that
there are two types of consumers, the informed and the uninformed consumers.
Informed consumers have zero search cost and pay at the lowest price in the
market. Uninformed consumers have positive search cost and engage in optimal
sequential search. In the Stahl model N firms set prices simultaneously to maxi-
mize profits, where the demand potentially comes from both types of consumers.
In this chapter we show, that even though the consumer’s search strategy is
much more complicated, the market analysis essentially remains the same. We
have two types of results that underline this general conclusion. First, the equi-
librium that is found by Stahl (1989) remains an equilibrium In this equilibrium
firms choose a price from a price distribution that is such that consumers with
a positive search cost buy immediately in the first store they visit even the def-
inition of the reservation price does not need to be adjusted. The second result
is that there are no other types of symmetric equilibria. Thus, the Stahl equi-
librium remains the unique symmetric equilibrium if we allow for costly second
visits. With costly second visits in principle firms may benefit from setting prices
above the reservation price of the first search round. The standard argument why
firms will not set prices above the first search round reservation price is that a
firm that charges a price equal to the upper bound will not sell to any consumer
as even the uninformed consumers will then continue to search after observing
such a price and have then at least two prices to compare and the other price(s)
are strictly smaller with probability one. This argument does not hold with costly
second visits as a competitors that are visited first may have prices that are lower,
but not so much lower that it pays for consumers to pay the cost of going back
to these previously visited stores. We show, however, that the structure of the
profit function is such, that if firms charge prices above first round reservation
prices, they can never compensate the loss of demand with higher revenue per
consumer.
Armstrong and Zhou (2010) give a particular interpretation of costly second
visits. They show that costly second visits can be re-interpreted as buy-now
discounts, i.e. as discounts consumers only get when they visit a firm for the
first time: as soon as they walk out of the store without buying the possibility
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to receive a discount disappears. there are two main differences between their
models and ours. We study an oligopolistic setting, where Armstrong and Zhou
(2010) employ a monopoly model. On the other hand, the buy-now discount in
Armstrong and Zhou (2010) is endogenously determined by firms, whereas our
costly second visit is exogenous. Our analysis may have various other applica-
tions, in particular they can be applicable to the analysis of shopping-malls (see
Non (2010)).
It is important to mention that our result holds true for the Stahl model and
that we cannot guarantee that it also holds for other search models. We find,
however, that from a theoretical perspective studying costly recall in the context
of a model where firms choose prices according to some mixed strategy equilib-
rium is more interesting than in a setup where the symmetric equilibrium is in
pure strategies (as in Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999)). In
the search models with homogeneous goods where the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies, the uncertainty for consumers what the next search will bring is en-
dogenously determined. In the search models with heterogeneous goods where
the equilibrium is in pure strategies, the uncertainty for consumers what the next
search will bring (and the reason for continued search) is exogeneously imposed
through the match function. This makes the introduction of costly second visits
in models a la Stahl theoretically challenging.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section two we briefly review the
industry setup introduced by Stahl (1989). In the next section we will use this
setup together with the results of Chapter 2 to show that there is no symmetric
equilibrium where consumers continue to search after having visited the first store
they visited. The last section concludes.
3.2 Model
We analyse the oligopolistic industry model that was first introduced in Stahl
(1989). Consider a market where N firms produce a homogenous good and have
identical production costs, which we normalize to zero. Each firm decides upon
the price at which it is going to sell the good in the market. There are two types of
consumers in the market. A fraction λ of all consumers are “shoppers”, i.e. these
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consumers like shopping or have zero search costs for other reasons. We assume
that these consumers know all prices in the market. The remaining fraction 1−λ
of consumers is uninformed. These consumers engage in sequential search and
get their first price quotation for free, but any subsequent price quotation comes
at a search cost c. All consumers have a unit demand and an identical valuation
for the good which we denote by v and v > c. If the consumer decides to go back
to the store she already visited before she incurs costs b where 0 ≤ b ≤ c.
The timing in the model is as follows. First, firms simultaneously decide on
their prices. A strategy of firm i is described by a probability distribution Fi(p).
We concentrate on symmetric equilibria with Fi(p) = F (p) for all i. Let p be the
lower bound of the support of the distribution and p be the upper bound of the
support. After firms made their decisions, consumers decide. Shoppers simply
buy at the firm with the lowest price. Uninformed consumers engage in optimal
search as decribed above and analysed in greater detail in the previous chapter.1
3.3 Analysis
In this section we analyse the optimal way for firms to behave. We start with the
question whether “Stahl-type” of pricing strategy, i.e. when all firms play mixed
strategies with the support up to first reservation price is indeed an equilibrium
in the model with costly second visits. Then we proceed with the investigation
whether other types of equilibria are possible. First, we show that there is no
equilibrium with “low” or “intermediate” level of the upper bound of the support,
i.e. when the upper bound of the support is higher than first reservation price
(Propositions 3.3.5, 3.3.6). Then we show that there is no equilibrium where the
upper bound of the support is larger than the largest reservation price plus the
costs of going back (Proposition 3.3.7).
We start the analysis with showing that the “Stahl-type” of equilibrium is
also an equilibrium in the model with costly second visits.
Proposition 3.3.1. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium where all firms charge
prices below the first-round reservation price.
1This assumption is often made in the search literature but can be relaxed; see Janssen,
Moraga and Wildenbeest (2005) for details.
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Proof. If the upper bound of the support p = ρ1, then maxp ρ1(p) = . . . =
maxp ρN−1(p) = ρpr. Therefore, the equilibrium defined in Stahl (1989) is an
equilibrium if none of the firms has a profitable deviation. The only (potentially
profitable) way for firms to deviate is to charge prices above ρ1. However, then
this firm has a zero demand both from informed and uninformed consumers.
Therefore, a profitable deviation does not exist, and the Stahl type of equilibrium
is indeed an equilibrium.
Our analysis showing the Stahl type of equilibrium is the unique equilibrium
starts with a technical lemma establishing the relation between the highest and
the lowest reservation prices.
Lemma 3.3.2. For any p in the support of F (p) ρN−1(p)+b
ρpr
< 2.
Proof. Lemma 2.3.1 states that
ρN−1(p) = min
(
p+ b, c+ p+ b−
∫ p+b
p
F (p)dp, p∗N−1
)
,
where p∗N−1 satisfies the equation
p∗N−1 = c+ E(pN |pN < p∗N−1 + b)F (p∗N−1 + b) + (1− F (p∗N−1 + b))(p∗N−1 + b).
Note, that first, ρN−1(p) ≤ p∗N−1, and, second, p∗N−1 satisfies the equation
c+ b =
∫ p∗N−1+b
p
F (p)dp. (3.3.1)
The reservation price under perfect recall is defined by:
c =
∫ ρpr
p
F (p)dp. (3.3.2)
From (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) it follows that p∗N−1 + b < 2ρ
pr. Indeed, if this were
not true, by subtracting one equation from the other we get:
b =
∫ p∗N−1+b
ρpr
F (p)dp >
∫ 2ρpr
ρpr
F (p)dp ≥
∫ ρpr
0
F (p)dp > c, (3.3.3)
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which contradicts the assumption b < c. The second inequality stems from
the fact that F (p) in a non-decreasing function, the last form the definition of
ρpr. Therefore p∗N−1 + b < 2ρ
pr and since ρN−1(p) ≤ p∗N−1 the lemma is proved.
Corollary 3.3.3. ∀k ∈ (2, N) : ρk(p)+b
ρ1
< 2
Proof. Since ρk(p) ≤ ρN−1(p) (Proposition 2.3.7), ρ1 ≥ ρpr we get
ρk(p) + b
ρ1
<
ρN−1(p) + b
ρpr
< 2
Using these results we can now formally prove the idea that there are no other
symmetric equilibria than the generalized Stahl equilibrium. For such an equilib-
rium to exist it must be the case that the upper bound of the price distribution
is strictly larger ρpr. To simplify notation we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.3.4. Let’s denote rk to be the maximum possible reservation price
in the k-th search round, i.e., rk = maxp ρk(p).
The claim that there are no other symmetric equilibria is now proved in three
consecutive steps. Proposition 3.3.5 shows that there are no equilibria where the
upper bound of the support is smaller than to rN−1). Proposition 3.3.6 shows
that there are no equilibria where the upper bound of the support is in between
rN−1 and rN−1 + b). Finally, Proposition 3.3.7 shows that there are no equilibria
where the upper bound of the support is above rN−1 + b.
Proposition 3.3.5. There is no equilibrium price distribution with r1 < p <
rN−1.
Proof. It is easy to see that given the optimal search behavior all reservation
prices are below or equal to the upper bound of the support of the distribution.
Indeed, suppose p < rN−1. Recall, that
c+ b =
∫ rN−1+b
p
F (p)dp
then
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c =
∫ rN−1
p
F (p)dp
and therefore rN−1 = ρpr, which is not possible.
Now we analyze the “intermediate” case where the upper bound would be
p ∈ [rN−1, rN−1 + b]. The proof of this proposition is based on the fact that
in order to compensate firms for the loss in demand resulting from charging
above rN−1, the upper bound of the distribution has to be above 2r1 − b, which
contradicts the relationship between reservation prices that is consistent with the
search perspective as established Lemma 3.3.2.
Proposition 3.3.6. There is no equilibrium price distribution with p ∈ [rN−1, rN−1+
b].
Proof. First, consider profits at r1 and at p:
pi(r1) = λ(1− F (r1))N−1r1 + 1− λ
N
Sr1
and
pi(p) = Y p
It is clear, that S ≥ 2−F (r1). If firm charges p > rN−1 it only sells something,
if all other firms set prices at least above r1 (otherwise all consumers stop on the
first step). Therefore, Y < (1−F (r1))N−1 < (1−F (r1)). Then it should be that
1− λ
N
(2− F (r1))r1 < 1− λ
N
(1− F (r1))p ≤ 1− λ
N
(1− F (r1))(rN−1 + b)
and therefore rN−1+b
r1
> 2 which contradicts Corollary 3.3.3.
Thus, the theorem is proved.
Finally, we analyze the case where the upper bound is quite well above the
highest reservation price. This part of the overall proof is the most complicated
part. The idea of the proof is that if the upper bound of the support is larger
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than the highest reservation price, it is anyway bounded from above due to the
structure of the upper part of the support of an equilibrium price distribution.
This gives an upper bound on the profits firms receive from choosing a price
equal to the upper bound. On the other hand, we argue that a price equal to
the first-round reservation price should also be charged in equilibrium. Moreover,
we show that this first-round reservation price should be larger than some lower
bound, creating some lower bound on equilibrium profits. The last part of the
proof shows that the upper bound we construct is smaller than the constructed
lower bound yielding an inconsistency.
Proposition 3.3.7. There is no equilibrium price distribution with p > rN−1+b.
Proof. Let pi0 be the equilibrium profits. First, consider the profits of a firm
that charges p. As, by construction, p is in the support of the equilibrium price
distribution, equilibrium profits are given by:
pi0 =
1− λ
N
(1− F (p− b))N−1p (3.3.4)
As p > rN−1 + b, a firm charging p does not get any informed consumers
and only those uninformed consumers who have first visited all other firms, have
observed these firms charge prices above rN−1 and then do not want to go back
to these stores because of the cost of a second visit b. If a firm would charge p− b
instead, its profits would be at least equal to(
λ(1− F (p− b))N−1 + 1− λ
N
(1− F (p− 2b))N−1
)
(p− b)
which is larger than or equal to(
λ(1− F (p− b))N−1 + 1− λ
N
(1− F (p− b))N−1
)
(p− b).
Whether or not p − b is in the support of the equilibrium price distribution,
it should be the case that pi0 is larger than or equal to this expression, yielding
p ≤ 1− λ+ λN
λN
b (3.3.5)
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Therefore,
pi0 < φ(λ,N) ≡ (1− λ)1− λ+ λN
λN2
b (3.3.6)
this is the upper bound on the equilibrium profit. Next, we will construct a
lower bound on the equilibrium profit. To this end, consider profits at r1. It is
easy to see that r1 should be in the support of the equilibrium price distribution
as (i) by definition of r1 it cannot be the case that the whole price distribution
lies above r1 and (ii) if the largest price in the support of the equilibrium price
distribution below r1 is strictly smaller than r1, then a firm could increase to
profits by deviating and charge r1. To simplify notation, let F (r1) = m. We then
have that
pi0 = λ(1−m)N−1r1 + 1− λ
N
Sr1,
where S ≥ 1 is the total probability that a consumer buys from the firm,
arising form all possible search paths of consumers. The firm charging r1 gets at
least 1/N consumers who randomly arrive at its store in the first search round
and N−1
N
1
N−1(1 −m) of consumers who first visit another store, observe a price
strictly larger than r1 and then randomly visits the store under consideration.
thus, it follows that S ≥ 2 − m. Therefore, for any p ≤ r0 in the equilibrium
support:
pi0 = λ(1− F (p))N−1p+ 1− λ
N
Sp,
which gives,
F (p) = 1−
(
pi0
pλ
− 1− λ
Nλ
S
) 1
N−1
and
p(r1) =
Nλ(1−m)N−1 + (1− λ)S
Nλ+ (1− λ)S r1.
Now consider a family of probability distributions:
F (p;K) = 1−
(
pi0
pλ
− 1− λ
Nλ
S
) 1
K−1
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Then for M ≥ K F (p,M) ≤ F (p,K). Moreover, if we define r1(K) as∫ r1(K)+b
p(r1(K))
F (p;K)dp = c+ b,
then we get that the solution of this equation r1(K) is an increasing function
of K, because p(r1(K) is linearly increasing in r1(K) with slope less than 1 and
F (p,K) is decreasing in K. Therefore, r1(2) ≤ r1(K) for any K. It is also
clear that r1(K) is increasing in c, therefore, r1(2)|c=b ≤ r1(2)|c>b. Let’s denote
r∗ = r1(2)|c=b. It follows that r∗ is implicitly defined by∫ r∗+b
p(r∗)
F (p, 2)dp = 2b
and therefore
∫ r∗
p(r∗)
F (p, 2)dp ≥ b
or
∫ r∗
p(r∗)
(
1− pi0
pλ
+
1− λ
Nλ
S
)
dp =
(
1 +
1− λ
Nλ
S
)
(r∗ − p(r∗))− pi0
λ
ln
r∗
p(r∗)
≥ b.
As r∗ ≤ r1 for any N, b, c 8and fixed S,m it follows that
pi0 ≥ λ(1−m)N−1r∗ + 1− λ
N
Sr∗. (3.3.7)
By plugging in the expressions for p(r∗) and this lower bound on pi0 we get
(
1 +
1− λ
Nλ
S
)
(r∗−p(r∗)) = λN + (1− λ)S
λN
Nλ(1− (1−m)N−1)
λN + (1− λ)S r
∗ = (1−(1−m)N−1)r∗
pi0
λ
ln
r∗
p(r∗)
≥ r
∗
λ
(
λ(1−m)N−1 + 1− λ
N
S
)
ln
Nλ+ (1− λ)S
(1−m)N−1Nλ+ (1− λ)S
which gives a lower bound for r∗:
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r∗ ≥ λb
λ(1− (1−m)N−1)− (λ(1−m)N−1 + 1−λ
N
S
)
ln Nλ+(1−λ)S
(1−m)N−1Nλ+(1−λ)S
.
Therefore pi0 ≥ ψ0(λ,m,N, S) where
ψ0(λ,m,N, S) ≡
λ
(
λ(1−m)N−1 + 1−λ
N
S
)
b
λ(1− (1−m)N−1)− (λ(1−m)N−1 + 1−λ
N
S
)
ln Nλ+(1−λ)S
(1−m)N−1Nλ+(1−λ)S
.
This is the lower bound on equilibrium profits. It is straightforward to verify that
∂
∂S
ψ0(λ,m,N, S) > 0 and because S ≥ 2−m we get that
pi0 ≥ ψ0(λ,m,N, S) > ψ(λ,m,N) ≡ ψ0(λ,m,N, 2−m).
Now, since pi0 < φ(λ,N) and pi0 > ψ(λ,m,N) the equilibrium can only exist
if the lower bound on profits is smaller than the upper bound, or ξ(λ,m,N) ≡
φ(λ,N)− ψ(λ,m,N) > 0.
It is possible to verify that ψ(λ,m,N) is decreasing function of m and that
lim
m→1
1
(1− λ)b · ξ(λ,m,N) =
1− λ+ λN
λN2
− λ
Nλ− (1− λ) ln 1−λ+Nλ
1−λ
. (3.3.8)
Therefore ξ(λ,m,N) > 0 only if the denominator of the second fraction in
(3.3.8) is negative, which is equivalent to
ln
Nλ+ 1− λ
1− λ >
λN
1− λ, (3.3.9)
or, the denominator is positive, but the expression still holds, which is equivalent
to
ln
Nλ+ 1− λ
1− λ <
λN
1− λ+Nλ. (3.3.10)
Let us start with (3.3.9). It is clear that at λ = 0 both the right hand side
and the left hand side of (3.3.9) are equal to 0. However,
∂
∂λ
(
ln Nλ+1−λ
1−λ − λN1−λ
)
=
− λN2
(1−λ)2(1−λ+Nλ) < 0
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Thus, the left hand side of (3.3.9) increases slower than the right hand side,
and thus (3.3.9) can never hold.
Now we proceed with (3.3.10). Again, at λ = 0 both the right hand side and
the left hand side of (3.3.10) equal to 0. If we take the derivative of the difference
again we get
∂
∂λ
(
ln Nλ+1−λ
1−λ − λN1−λ+Nλ
)
=
λN2
(1−λ)(1−λ+Nλ)2 > 0.
Therefore, the left hand side of (3.3.10) increases faster than the right hand
side, and so (3.3.10) cannot hold either. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with
p > rN−1.
Thus, the “Stahl-type” of equilibrium is the only symmetric equilibrium in
the model.
3.4 Conclusions
Most consumer search models assume that consumers have costless access to
prices in stores they already visited, but have to pay a search cost to visit the
store in the first place. In the previous chapter we have shown that without
the assumption of costless second visits, the optimal sequential search rule is
no longer characterized a unique, stationary reservation price. Thus, the costless
recall assumption is, however, at odds with the general consumer search literature
where the cost consumers have to make to buy at a particular store are central:
if there is a cot to go to the store in the first place, there is often also a (smaller)
cost of going back to that store.
In this chapter we have shown that search cost literature does not need to
make this assumption of costless recall by analyzing whether the results presented
in the celebrated paper by Stahl (1989) are robust to the assumption of costly
second visits: our analysis shows that the equilibrium analyzed by Stahl remains
an equilibrium under the alternative assumption of costly second visits and that,
in addition, there do not exist other possible symmetric equilibrium outcomes in
the oligopolistic competition setup. even though the optimal search behaviour
of the consumers can be very complicated, firms behave in such a way that they
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do not change prices above the first search round reservation price. The main
reason for this finding is that if a firm charges a price above this first search
round reservation price, it loses relatively so many consumers that can never be
sufficiently compensated by the increase in price. Given this striking result, it is
interesting to see in future research whether a similar conclusion holds true for
other search models.
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Chapter 4
Minimum Price Guarantees In a
Consumer Search Model
4.1 Introduction
It is well known that minimum price guarantees (MPGs) of one sort or the other
are found in many sectors and industries. In retail markets, minimum price
guarantees (MPGs) often take the form that sellers offer consumers who buy their
products to match any other price a competitor charges for identical products
provided that they have proof that an identical product is sold by a competitor
at a nearby shop within a well-defined time period. It is this type of pricing
matching policy that is our main interest in this paper. Major department stores,
electronic goods stores and many other retail companies offer MPG in order to
insure their potential clients against the possibility that they later regret buying
the good if a lower price has been found in a competitor’s store. Alternative
forms of MPGs offer to give back (100+x )% of the price difference (so called
price beating strategies) or offer a ‘free lunch’ in addition to matching prices
(see, e.g., IKEA stores).1 Most firms give the price difference only to consumers
who provide evidence of lower prices elsewhere and do not commit to change list
1The biggest supermarket in the Netherlands, Albert Heijn, introduced in spring 2009 a
policy that gave customers a free apple pie in addition to ”all your money back policy” in case
customers could show that other shops had lower prices for identical products.
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prices.1
The effect of MPGs on the (pricing) behavior of competitors has been dis-
cussed in the economics as well as in the business and the law literature. The
main conclusion from these literatures is that despite the appearance of creat-
ing additional competitive pressure on the pricing behaviour of firms, MPGs are
in fact highly anticompetitive. One argument that has been made (cf., Salop
(1986)) is that MPGs facilitate collusion as they remove the incentives to under-
cut. MPGs, so it is argued, do not just contain information for consumers, but
in fact convey the information to competitors that any attempt to undercut will
be automatically followed, i.e., MPGs work as a trigger strategy that helps firms
to collude. Moreover, MPGs are an extremely cheap way of doing so as firms
do not have to spend any resources on monitoring competitor’s behaviour. Al-
though some MPGs take the form that firms ex ante commit to change their list
prices if they are informed that a competitor has a lower price (see above), most
MPGs restrict the MPG to the client that has informed the firm of a lower price
elsewhere, i.e., list prices are unaffected. This means that most MPGs actually
are dissimilar to trigger strategies and it is therefore unclear whether they really
support collusive practices.
A second argument that has been made (cf., Png and Hirschleifer (1987)) is
that MPGs are an effective way to price discriminate between shoppers and non-
shoppers. In the absence of MPGs, the activity of shoppers forces firms to reduce
prices market- wide. Shoppers provide a positive externality to non-shoppers and
force firms to set more competitive prices. With MPGs, however, the effect of the
disciplining power of shoppers is limited to these shoppers themselves according
to Png and Hirschleifer and act as a price discrimination mechanism for firms
that can set high list prices and provide shoppers with discounts (see, also, Edlin
(1997)). One shortcoming of the model proposed by Png and Hirschleifer is that
the behavior of shoppers and non-shoppers is exogeneously imposed: shoppers
always compare all prices, and more importantly, non-shoppers always go to one
shop and buy if the price charged is below their willingness to pay. The effect
MPGs may have on the search behavior of consumers is not analyzed.
1There are, however, some firms that commit to lowering list prices if competitors offer
lower prices (see, e.g., Comet Services at comet.co.uk).
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According to both arguments discussed so far, the imposition of MPGs re-
duces economic welfare and this had led Edlin (1997) to investigate the legal
possibilities to prohibit MPGs under the Sherman Act. Recently, Moorthy and
Winter (2006) have argued that MPGs may also have a pro-competitive effect in
case products are horizontally differentiated and firms have different production
costs. In such a context MPGs may signal to consumers that the firm under
consideration really has a lower price. The lower price that is charged gener-
ates sufficient additional demand to compensate the firm for the lower profit per
unit. High cost firms may find it too expensive to imitate the low pricing be-
havior of low cost firms, thereby allowing MPGs to work as a signalling device.
Moorthy and Winter’s model nicely illustrates how MPGs may work in markets
with product heterogeneity. Most MPGs clauses, however, stipulate that the
guarantee only comes into effect if prices of identical products at nearby shops
are compared. This means that Moorthy and Winter’s analysis is restricted to
markets where geographical differentiation is important and transportation costs
are high. Chen et al. (2001) also show that price matching policies may have
pro-competitive effects in case they are pre-announced and there are consumers
who prefer to shop at a particular store but are mindful of saving opportunities.
In this paper the “search” behaviour of customers is also exogenously given as in
Png and Hirschleifer (1987) and Varian (1980).
In this paper, we argue that MPGs have an important effect on the search be-
haviour of consumers which so far has not neglected in the literature on minimum
price guarantees. To study this effect, we cast our model in a conventional sequen-
tial search setup a la Stahl (1989). Moreover, we assume that there is a certain
probability that after the purchase a customer is informed about another price
quotation. This probability represents the level of information communication
among the customers (as in Galeotti (2009)). In such a setting, the main decision
consumers have to make concerns their reservation price, i.e., the maximal price
at which they will buy. We show that an MPG increases this reservation price
as in the presence of MPGs consumers do not only buy the commodity under
consideration, but in addition buy an option that if they are later informed of
lower prices, they get the price difference back. Consumers value this option and
this increases their reservation prices. Higher reservation prices, in turn, give
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firms the opportunity to raise their list prices, thereby increasing their profits.
Thus, the key point of the paper is that the option value MPGs present impacts
on the distribution of prices set by firms.
Another notable difference between our model and the existing literature is
that we consider situations where consumers do not know in advance whether
a firm that is visited has an MPG or not, i.e., MPGs are not pre-announced or
advertised and consumers just encounter them when they arrive in a store. This
setting where information about MPGs is revealed simultaneously with price
information fits major consumer markets, such as electronics shops. In many of
these shops, firms often put a label “minimum price guarantee” on their price
labels, but not on their whole assortment. Moreover, at different points in time
they have different products to which the MPG applies.1
We arrive at the following results. First, in our environment only two types
of equilibria exist: one where firms do not set MPGs at all, and one where firms
set MPGs with a certain positive probability, which is strictly smaller than one.
The latter equilibrium only exists when the level of communication among con-
sumers is relatively high. Thus, importantly, an equilibrium where firms set
MPGs for sure does not exist. This explains that in markets where MPGs are
not announced, but only discovered when a costumer arrives in the shop, firms
randomize the products for which the MPG applies. This often happens in su-
permarkets and electronics stores. Second, the support of the equilibrium price
distribution of a firm that provides MPG is always above the support of the dis-
tribution of a firm without MPG. This fact that firms setting MPGs have prices
that are not below the prices of rivals firms without MPG is supported by em-
pirical research (see Arbatskaya et al. (2004)). To understand the proper effect
of MPGs empirically, our paper suggest, however, that one should not just com-
pare prices in stores with and without MPGs, but instead one should also inquire
whether the prices in stores without MPGs are shifted upwards when MPG can
be set with some probability. Despite the fact that consumers can execute their
1We do not want to argue that this setting where MPGs are not pre-announced applies to
all markets and it is certainly an interesting question to investigate what market characteristics
are more prone to pre-announced MPGs and where pre-announcements are not observed. We
leave this as a question for future research.
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MPG with some positive probability if they are informed of lower prices, con-
sumers are strictly worse off. Moreover, the better consumers communicate, the
higher the equilibrium prices and the higher the prices consumers expect to pay
even taking the probability into account that consumers can execute the MPG.
Finally, we consider the possibility of firms offering price-beating strategies and
show that they are always dominated by price-matching policies. The reason is
that in markets where MPGs are not pre-announced, in equilibrium MPGs only
affect the reservation prices.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present the
setup of the model. Section three contains the equilibrium analysis and main
comparative statics results. In section four we show that price-beating is never
optimal. Section five briefly concludes.
4.2 Setup
Consider a market where two firms produce a homogenous good and have identical
production costs, which we normalize to zero. Firms set prices and decide whether
or not to provide minimum price guarantees (MPGs). By providing an MPG, a
firm commits to compensate the difference between its price and the price of the
competitor, if the customer who has bought the product from the firm provides
evidence that the lower price exists.
Like in the model of Stahl (1989) there are two types of consumers. A fraction
λ ∈ (0, 1) of all consumers are “shoppers”, i.e. these consumers like shopping or
have zero search costs for other reasons. We assume that these consumers know
all prices in the market as well as whether some of the firms set minimum price
guarantees. The remaining fraction 1 − λ of consumers is uninformed. These
consumers engage in sequential search and get their first price quotation for free,
but any subsequent price quotation comes at a search cost c. All consumers have
identical valuation for the good denoted by v and v > c. We assume that v is
non-binding in the model, i.e. it is sufficiently large not to influence reservation
prices. Whether a firm provides MPGs or not is revealed simultaneously with
observing the price quotation of that firm. After the consumer has bought the
good there is an exogenous probability µ ∈ (0, 1) that she observes (costlessly)
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the price of another firm. This information can come either form friends (as in
Galeotti (2009)) or just accidentally because she noticed the price in the other
store.
The timing in the model is as follows. First, firms simultaneously decide on
their prices and minimum price guarantees. Firm i decides to set up minimum
price guarantee with probability αi, and then set prices with a probability distri-
bution F i0(p) if no minimum price guarantees set, and with F
i
1(p) if it provides
a MPG. Thus, the strategy of firm i is a tuple {αi, F i0(p), F i1(p)}. After firms
made their decisions, consumers decide. Shoppers buy at the firm with the low-
est price.1 After observing a first price, uninformed consumers have to decide
whether to buy at that firm or to continue search. After all purchasing decisions
have been made, customers have some probability of getting a price quotation of
the firm, which they did not search. If this price is less than the purchase price,
and the purchase was made in a firm providing an MPG, the customer costlessly
claims the price difference, which is paid back by the firm.
We look for symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria. In such an equilibrium
firms choose the same probability of setting MPGs and choose prices with the
same probability density function in case they do and do not set MPGs, i.e., we
look for equilibria where {α1, F 10 (p), F 11 (p)} = {α2, F 20 (p), F 21 (p)}.
4.3 Analysis
We start our analysis by investigating the search behaviour of uninformed con-
sumers. To this end, let us denote by {p
j
, pj} the lower and upper bounds of
Fj(p), j = 0, 1 and p = min{p0, p1}. Let F (p) = (1 − α)F0(p) + αF1(p) be the
weighted average of the two equilibrium price distributions. Then the optimal
search behaviour is defined by two reservation prices: one for firms with and
another for firms without an MPG.
1In principle, if on of the firms charges the price lower than its competitor, while the
competitor sets up the minimum price guarantees, shopper should be indifferent between the
firms. We take one of possible models of their behaviour. One can think that there are infinitely
small costs  of claiming MPG, so shoppers prefer just to buy at the lowest price.
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Lemma 4.3.1. Uninformed consumers accept all prices at or below r0 at a firm
that does not provide MPG, and continue search otherwise; they accept all the
prices at or below r1 at a firm with MPG, and continue to search otherwise,
where {r0, r1} are defined by ∫ r0
p
F (p)dp = c∫ r1
p
F (p)dp =
c
1− µ
(4.3.1)
Proof. After observing price r0 at a firm without minimum price guarantees, a
consumer has to be indifferent between buying now and continuing to search. If
the consumer continues to search, she proceeds to the next firm. The next firm
does not set MPG with probability 1 − α, and in this case the consumer can
choose the smallest price of r0 and a random price p that is distributed according
to F0. Similarly, for when she continues to search and happens to visit a store
with MPG, which occurs with probability α. Therefore
r0 = c+ (1− α) (F0(r0)E0(p|p < r0) + (1− F0(r0))r0)
+ α (F1(r0)E1(p|p < r0) + (1− F1(r0))r0)
using integration by parts, this expression can be simplified to the usual rule
determining the reservation prices.∫ r0
p
F (p)dp = c
Now consider the case when the customer found herself at a shop that pro-
vides MPG. In this case if the customer accepts the price there is a probability
µ that later she observes another price, which is either from a no-MPG store
(with probability 1 − α) or from a MPG store (with probability α). If she de-
cides to continues searching, the situation is similar to the case described above.
Therefore, the reservation price is defined by
(1− µ)r1 + µ[(1− α) (F0(r1)E0(p|p < r1) + (1− F0(r1))r1)
+ α (F1(r1)E1(p|p < r1) + (1− F1(r1))r1)] =
= c+ (1− α) (F0(r1)E0(p|p < r1) + (1− F0(r1))r1)
+ α (F1(r1)E1(p|p < r1) + (1− F1(r1))r1)
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which simplifies to ∫ r1
p
F (p)dp =
c
1− µ
It immediately follows from the lemma that r1 > r0, i.e., a consumer is willing
to buy at a higher price if the firm happens to provide an MPG. This is quite
natural as the consumer has a probability to receive a pay-back in case a MPG is
provided. One can clearly see this happening for values of µ close to one. Indeed,
if µ is close to one, then the customer visiting a firm with a MPG clause almost
surely pays the minimum of the two prices in the market. If she decides to proceed
to search then she pays c and again buys at the minimum of the two prices that
are set. Thus, for high values of µ a consumer prefers to stop searching in the
MPG store, almost independently of the price it observes there.
Now we turn to the equilibrium pricing behaviour of firms. It is a standard
result in the consumer search literature that both F0(p), F1(p) are atomless and
that p0 = r0, p1 = r1. To provide a full characterization of equilibrium, we first
show that certain types of equilibria cannot exist.
Proposition 4.3.2. There is no symmetric equilibria with 0 < α < 1 and r0 > p1.
Proof. First, consider the profits of a firm which sets no minimum price guaran-
tees. these profits are given by
pi0 = λ(1− F (p))p+ 1− λ
2
p. (4.3.2)
On the other hand, profits of a firm that provides MPG are equal to
pi1 = λ(1− F (p))p+ 1− λ
2
((1− µ)p+ µF (p)E(p′|p′ < p) + µ(1− F (p))p) ,
(4.3.3)
where the expectation is taken with respect to F (p) and p ≤ r1. It is quite
clear that equations (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) determine two different functional forms
for F (p). However, for the firm to be indifferent between setting and not setting
a MPG it has to be the case that pi0(p) = pi1(p) for all prices where the support
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of two distributions overlap. But this cannot be the case in more than one point,
which together with that fact that r1 > r0 completes the proof.
Thus, if there is a positive probability that in equilibrium one firm provides
MPGs, while the other does not, then it has to be the case that the price distri-
butions are not overlapping. Given this result, we have three possible candidate
equilibria: (i) α = 0, (ii) α = 1 and (iii) 0 < α < 1 but then r0 ≤ p1, i.e., a firm
that does not provide an MPG will charge lower prices for sure than a firm with
MPG.
We next argue that an equilibrium where both firms provide MPGs cannot
exist either. In this, and the next propostions, it is important to realize that
reservation prices are defined with respect to corresponding equilibrium price dis-
tributions. For example, if in an equilibrium both firms set MPG the consumer
strategy is still represented by two reservation prices (r0, r1), both of them are de-
fined by (4.3.1) using F (p) = F1(p). A similar point holds true for an equilibrium
candidate where none of the firms sets MPG.
Proposition 4.3.3. There is no equilibrium where both firms play α = 1.
Proof. If one firm chooses α = 1 then the competitor has a profitable deviation
by choosing α = 0 and price r0 which (as F (p) = F1(p) in this case) is defined by∫ r0
p
1
F1(p)dp = c. Indeed, since it has to be the case that p1 < r0 < r1, r0 lies in
the support of F1(p) and we get
pi(r0) = λ(1− F (r0))r0 + 1− λ
2
r0 >
> λ(1− F (r0))r0 + 1− λ
2
((1− µ)r0 + µE(min(p, r0))) = pi1.
Therefore, there is a profitable deviation.
The idea behind this proposition is basically as follows. If a firm deviates from
the proposed equilibrium where both firms provide MPG and simply sets the same
price (in the lower end of the equilibrium distribution), but abandons the MPG,
then the firm gets the same expected number of customers as with MPG, but
the expected price paid by non-shoppers is higher since these consumers cannot
exercise MPG anymore.
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We now examine and characterize the remaining two candidate equilibria
sequentially.
Proposition 4.3.4. For all values of parameters there is an equilibrium where
both firms choose α = 0. The equilibrium price distribution in this case is
F0(p) = 1− 1− λ
2λ
r0 − p
p
(4.3.4)
Proof. Since F (p) = F0(p) we have∫ r0
p
F0(p)dp = c∫ r1
p
F0(p)dp =
c
1− µ.
In equilibrium each firms gets a profit of pi0 =
1−λ
2
r0. Assume, one firm devi-
ates and provides MPGs. Then the highest possible profit that can be obtained is
by charging p = r1. Indeed, it is clear that a firm only benefits from the deviation
if p > r0 (otherwise it gets the same number of customers, but might experience a
loss from searchers who can exercise MPG), but then the shoppers would not buy
from this firm anyway, so the firm has to extract maximum profits from shoppers,
which is attained by charging p = r1. Then
pi1 =
1− λ
2
((1− µ)r1 + µE(p|p < r1)) = 1− λ
2
((1− µ)r1 + µ(r0 − c))
so that
pi1 > pi0 ⇔ r1 − r0 > µc
1− µ
But we have
r1 − r0 =
∫ r1
r0
1dp =
∫ r1
r0
F0(p)dp =
∫ r1
p
F0(p)dp−
∫ r0
p
F0(p)dp =
c
1− µ − c =
µc
1− µ
Thus, the best possible deviation gives the same payoff and a firm cannot
strictly benefit from deviating.
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Finally, we focus on the intermediate case where firms do provide MPGs with
some probability. The following proposition establishes existence of an equilib-
rium in mixed strategies.
Proposition 4.3.5. An equilibrium with α ∈ (0, 1) exists if and only if
1 > µ >
4λ2
(1− λ)2 ln 1−λ
1+λ
+ 2λ(1 + λ)
>
2
3
(4.3.5)
Proof. See Appendix.
This result might seem to be a bit counterintuitive: firms set up (with some
probability) MPGs only if there is sufficient probability that customers would
exercise it. The explanation of course is that if µ is sufficiently high, consumers
would accept higher prices at the store with MPG which more than offsets the
adverse effect of exercising MPG on firms profits.
The following two Figures represent the relationship between the equilibrium
probability of observing minimum price guarantees and the parameters of the
model. Equation (4.3.5) shows that the probability of observing other prices
should be relatively large. Figure 4.1 depicts the relation between the equilibrium
probability of firms offering MPGs and the probability with which consumers
observe another price quotation. The figure shows this relationship is positive:
α is increasing with µ. Though high values of µ imply that ex post most of the
consumers are informed ones, uninformed consumers are willing to buy at higher
prices for higher µ. If µ is close to one, customer’s are willing to accept virtually
any price lower than v. Therefore firms are more likely to set MPGs and sell at
higher prices when µ is large. Not surprisingly, Figure 4.2 shows that the greater
the fraction of shoppers λ the lower the probability with which firms set MPG.
Now we proceed with the comparative statics analysis. The following propo-
sition compares expected prices paid by consumers in the equilibrium with MPG
and in the equilibrium without it.
Proposition 4.3.6. Expected profits for firms in the equilibrium where MPGs
are offered with positive probability are higher than the expected profits in the
equilibrium without MPGs. As a consequence, in the equilibrium where MPGs
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium probability of MPG as a function of µ at λ = 0.2.
µ
α
are offered consumers pay higher expected prices (after a possible execution of
MPG) than in the equilibrium without MPGs.
Proof. In fact, the equilibrium without MPG described by the same formulas as
the equilibrium with MPG when α is set to be zero. The level of equilibrium
profits for the equilibrium with MPG is
pi(α) =
λ(1− λ+ 2αλ)
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln (1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
)c
Then
∂pi
∂α
=
4(1− α)λ3(
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln (1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
))2 c > 0
Proposition 3.7 shows the “anticompetitive” effect of a MPG in a search en-
vironment in the sense that in the equilibrium with MPGs the expected price is
higher than in the equilibrium where MPGs are not offered for sure. The source
of the anticompetitive effect is, however, different from that so far studied in the
literature. It is not the case here that there is some type of collusive behaviour
between the firms where MPGs play the role of a monitoring device. In our case
the result is fully driven by consumer behaviour, namely by the willingness of
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium probability of MPG as a function of λ at µ = 0.8.
λ
α
consumers to accept higher prices when firms do offer MPG. Another interesting
observation is that the higher expected price paid in the equilibrium with MPG
comes from two sources: (i) A firm charging an MPG can set a higher prices
on average because of the higher reservation price of consumers at firms with
an MPG and (ii) other firms without MPG react to these higher prices by set-
ting higher prices themselves. Thus, also a firm that effectively does not charge
MPGs has a higher price paid in the equilibrium where MPGs are charged with
some positive probability compared to the equilibrium without MPGs. Figure 4.3
shows how a firm’s expected profits depend on µ in the equilibrium where MPGs
are offered with some probability and the equilibrium profits without MPGs. In
the latter case, profits are, of course, a constant, whereas they are exponentially
increasing in µ whenever this equilibrium exists.
4.4 Price-beating and free-lunch strategies
We next turn to the question whether firms will ever choose to provide price beat-
ing guarantees (PBG), if they do not announce (advertise) this policy in advance
before consumers search for prices. To study this question, assume firms not only
guarantee the purchase at the minimum price in the market if a lower price has
been observed, but to compensate the customer even further by informing the
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Figure 4.3: Expected profits as a function of µ at λ = 0.2.
µ
pi
No MPGs
MPGs
customer that if she provides evidence of a lower price, say p′, the effective pur-
chase price will be βp′, where β ≤ 1. The probability with which a price-beating
strategy is chosen is (again) denoted by the probability α.
Even without a characterisation of the optimal search rule, we can argue that
it is never optimal for a firm to offer a price beating strategies if it does not
announce this policy in advance.1 In the following two propositions we assume
that prices charged are less or equal to corresponding reservation prices.
Proposition 4.4.1. It is never optimal for a firm to offer a price beating policy
with β < 1.
Proof. Consider the profit function of a firm in an equilibrium where it provides
a price-beating policy β:
pi = λ ((1− α)(1− F (p))p+ F (p)E(βp′|p′ < p))
+ 1−λ
2
((1− µ)p+ µ(1− F (p))p+ µF (p)E(βp′|p′ < p)) (4.4.1)
The first term of this formula represent the profit the firm gets from informed
customers. These consumers buy when this firm either has the highest price as
1http://www.besparingsmeter.nl:80/2009/06/17/winkelen/sla-je-slag-bij-ah/ reports cases
where students bring cases with beer out of the supermarket Albert Heijn. After that Albert
Heijn stopped this policy.
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in that case they buy in order to exercise the price beating guarantee, or when
the other firm has a higher price and does not offer a price beating policy. The
last term represents the profit from uninformed customers. These consumers
effectively buy at price p either because they are not informed about another
price, or because the other firm charges a higher price. If the other firm charges
a lower price, these consumers effectively pay a fraction of this lower price if they
are informed about it. If the firm deviates and charges a higher β, it receives
a higher profit as ∂
∂β
E(βp′|p′ < p) > 0 and the equilibrium price distribution is
unaffected by the deviation. Thus, we have ∂pi
∂β
> 0 and therefore it is optimal for
a firm to set β = 1.
This result shows that in markets where PBGs are not announced to con-
sumers in advance so that consumers only are aware of these guarantees once
they are in the shop and see the prices offered, price-matching is always preferred
to price-beating. This comes from the fact that price-beating in these markets
only affects the price the firm receives from those consumers who know the other
firm has a lower price, but it does not affect the number of consumers. Therefore,
for each individual firm it is better to choose β = 1, though if both firms were to
stick to some β < 1 it would result in higher profits per firm.
Instead of offering price-beating strategies companies could compensate the
price difference (match the price) and offer a “free lunch” on top of that. Thus,
instead of offering βp′ the firm offers p′ − x, where x is the value of the “lunch”.
The analysis and the results are very similar, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4.4.2. It is never optimal for a firm to offer a price beating policy
with x > 0.
Proof. Consider the profit function of a firm in an equilibrium where it offers:
pi = λ ((1− α)(1− F (p))p+ F (p)E(p′ − x|p′ < p))
+ 1−λ
2
((1− µ)p+ µ(1− F (p))p+ µF (p)E(p′ − x|p′ < p)) (4.4.2)
∂pi
∂x
< 0 because ∂
∂β
E(p′− x|p′ < p) < 0. Therefore it is optimal for the firm to
choose x as low as possible, therefore x = 0.
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4.5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the effect of firms offering price matching and price beating
strategies in a consumer search model where reservation prices are endogenously
determined. We restrict the analysis to markets where consumers are uninformed
about whether or not firms offer minimum price guarantees before they come to
the shop. We show that the effects of price matching and price beating are very
different. Price matching can be observed in equilibrium, but only as an outcome
of an equilibrium where firms randomize the decision to set minimum price guar-
antees. This may explain why multi-product firms (such as supermarkets and
electronics shops) offer these policies over an ever changing group of products
(if they offer them at all). We show that in the equilibrium where firms offer
minimum price guarantees with strictly positive probability, the expected prices
consumers pay are higher than in the equilibrium where no firm sets minimum
price guarantees. The main reason for this result is that consumers’ reservation
prices increase considerably as they factor in the probability that they will be
informed about lower prices later (and get their money back) and therefore they
are more eager to buy now even if the price is relatively high. Importantly, even
a shop that does not use minimum price guarantees sets higher prices on average.
this basically follows as MPGs soften the competition.
Price beating strategies are different and it is never optimal to set them. The
main reason is that firms do not gain additional consumers by setting such policies
and only risk to get lower expected prices in case the competitor has a lower price.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.6
To prove the proposition we explicitly construct and equilibrium and than show,
that there is such a value of α that all the equilibrium conditions are satisfied.
Equilibrium price distribution support contains two parts: [p, r0] ∪ [p1, r1].
The lower part of the support. The lower part of the support is defined by
three equations:
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pi = λ(1− F (p))p+ 1− λ
2
p
F (p) = 0
F (r0) = 1− α
These three equations allow to write down everything as a function of (r0, α).
Indeed,
pi(r0, α) =
2αλ+ 1− λ
2
r0 (4.5.1)
p(r0, α) =
2αλ+ 1− λ
1 + λ
r0
F (p; r0, α) =
(1 + λ)p− (1− λ+ 2αλ)r0
2λp
Which using optimal search rule∫ r0
p
F (p)dp = c
gives an expression for r0:
r0 =
2λc
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln (1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
) (4.5.2)
Thus, if the value of α is known the probability distribution on the lower part
of the support is fully described.
The upper part of the support. Now let’s consider the upper part.
The profit function is defined by:
pi = λ(1− F (p))p+ 1− λ
2
(
p− µ
∫ p
p
F (q)dq
)
(4.5.3)
Since
∫ r1
p
F (p)dp = c
1−µ we get
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pi =
1− λ
2
(
r1 − µc
1− µ
)
Same way since
∫ p
1
p
F (p)dp = c+ (1− α)(p
1
− r0) we get
pi = αλp
1
+
1− λ
2
(
p− µ(c+ (1− α)(p
1
− r0))
)
Now, using equations (4.5.1) and (4.5.2) we can get expressions for r1 and p1
as functions of α.
r1 =
2λ(1− λ(1− (2− µ)α) + αµ) + (1− λ)(1− λ+ 2αλ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
(1− λ)(1− µ) (2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln 1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
) c
p
1
=
(1− λ+ 2αλ) (2λ+ (1− λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
)
(1− λ(1− (2− µ)α− µ)− µ(1− α)) (2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln 1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
)c
Determination of α. To determine the value of α we use the following ap-
proach. We solve for the probability distribution on the upper part of the sup-
port using differential equation (4.5.3). The solution requires determination of the
constant, say Q using boundary condition. We have two of them: F (p
1
) = 1− α
and F (r1) = 1, which gives us two values of the constant Q1 and Q2. Since the
solution must satisfy both boundary conditions we get have to get Q1 = Q2 which
gives us the equation on α. Note, that we do not calculate the optimal search
integral here, since it is already incorporated in determination of r1
1.
We start with the following differential equation:
Ay(x) +Bxy′(x) + Cx+D = 0 (4.5.4)
The solution of this equation is
y(x) = QxA/B − Cx
A+B
− D
A
1Another, may be more natural approach, is to use just one boundary condition and then
explicitly calculate the search integral to get the equation for r0 and α, as we did for the lower
part of the support. However this approach results in more analytical complications, so we use
the one presented in the text.
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Now, if we compare (4.5.4) with (4.5.3) we can spot that it is the same equation
with x = p, y(x) =
∫ p
p
F (p)dp, y′(x) = F (p), A = −1−λ
2
µ, B = −λ, C = 1+λ
2
,
D = pi.
Thus, the equilibrium price distribution is defined by
F (p) =
1 + λ
2λ+ (1− λ)µ −Q
(1− λ)µ
2λ
p−
2λ+(1−λ)µ
2λ
where Q is determined by initial conditions. F (r1) = 1 and F (p1) = 1 − α
give two values Q1 and Q2 which has to be equal.
Q1 = −2λ(1− λ)µ
(
1− 1+λ
2λ+(1−λ)µ
)
(
c(2λ(1−λ(1−α(2−µ)−µ)−µ(1−α))−(1−λ)(1−(1−2α)λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
(1−λ)(1−µ)(2(1−α)λ+(1−(1−2α)λ) ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
)1+ (1−λ)µ
2λ
Q2 = −2λ(1− λ)µ
(
1− α− 1+λ
2λ+(1−λ)µ
)
(
c(1−(1−2α)λ)(2λ+(1−λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
(1−λ(1−α(2−µ)−µ)−µ(1−α))(2(1−α)λ+(1−(1−2α)λ) ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
)1+ (1−λ)µ
2λ
Equation Q1 = Q2 can be reduced to:
(
(1− λ)(1− µ)
1− λ(1− α(2− µ)− µ)− (1− α)µ
) (1−λ)µ
2λ
=(
2λ(1− λ+ 2αλ− α(1 + λ)µ) + (1− λ)(1− λ+ 2αλ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
(1− λ+ 2αλ) (2λ+ (1− λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
) ) 2λ+(1−λ)µ2λ
(4.5.5)
First, we evaluate (4.5.5) at α = 0. It is easy to spot that both LHS and
RHS takes values of 1 for all (λ, µ). Second, we claim that the LHS of equation
(4.5.5) evaluated at α = 1 is greater than the RHS. Indeed, after canceling some
terms the equation can be rewritten as
(
1−λ
1+λ
) (1−λ)µ
2λ = (1 − µ). Thus, the LHS is
increasing in λ and as λ→ 0 it goes to eµ which is greater than (1− µ). Finally,
we examine the behaviour both of LHS and RHS around α = 0. Obviously,
if LHS decreases faster than the RHS, there must be an intersection point at
63
4. MINIMUM PRICE GUARANTEES IN A CONSUMER
SEARCH MODEL
α ∈ (0, 1). The derivative of the LHS with respect to α evaluated at α = 0
equals to −µ(λ(2−µ)+µ)
2λ(1−µ) . The derivative of RHS evaluated at α = 0 equals to
− (1+λ)(λ(2−µ)+µ)µ
(1−λ)(2λ+(1−λ)µ ln 1−λ1+λ)
. Solving
−µ(λ(2− µ) + µ)
2λ(1− µ) < −
(1 + λ)(λ(2− µ) + µ)µ
(1− λ) (2λ+ (1− λ)µ ln 1−λ
1+λ
)
gives µ ∈ (− 2λ
1−λ , 0) ∪ ( 4λ
2
(1−λ)2 ln 1−λ
1+λ
+2λ(1+λ)
,∞). Given that µ is between 0 and
1 we get (4.3.5).
Now we show that f(λ) ≡ 4λ2
(1−λ)2 ln 1−λ
1+λ
+2λ(1+λ)
> 2/3. First, this expression is
increasing in λ with f(1) = 1. Second, we take a limit limλ→0 f(λ). By applying
l’Hopital’s rule twice we get:
lim
λ→0
f(λ) =
8
43+λ(3+λ)
(1+λ)2
+ 2 ln 1−λ
1+λ
=
2
3
To prove that (4.3.5) is also a necessary condition we show that if the derivative
of LHS of (4.5.5) is greater than the derivative of the RHS at α = 0 than the
LHS is higher than the RHS for any other α. That implies that there is no such
a value of α which can equate both sides of the equation. Note, that both LHS
and RHS of (4.5.5) are smooth functions in α, λ, µ. Therefore, we can directly
verify the result on a mesh for (α, λ, µ) ∈ (0, 1)3. Numerical verification shows
that (4.3.5) is indeed not only sufficient, but a necessary condition as well.
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Chapter 5
On the relevance of irrelevant
information
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of information and interdepen-
dencies in the search process.
Consider a situation where you are planning to buy a book. You can read
reviews on two different websites, say amazon.co.uk and amazon.com, and you
are only interested in a book if it has positive reviews on both websites. Of
course, reading reviews costs you some time. If you know that English readers
are generally more skeptical than American readers, which website should you
search first? Can it be optimal to stop and buy a book after searching just one
site?
One can also think about an investment decision problem. Suppose the re-
search department of a large company has to find out whether to buy a particular
firm or to launch a new technology. The true value of the firm (the benefits of
the technology) is unknown, and depends on two unknown parameters. For ex-
ample, to calculate the value of the firm it is necessary to estimate future cash
flows, and therefore it is necessary both to assess how the firm’s costs will evolve
and to predict demand fluctuations. These two factors are obviously somewhat
correlated, at least due to mutual macroeconomic factors in prediction, such as
the GDP growth rate or inflation. An accurate forecast can be quite costly and
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require both internal and external resources (such as marketing forecasts). Which
of the parameters should the company research? What is the optimal order? Or
perhaps some of the parameters do not require detailed investigation? For exam-
ple, in an economy with high inflation both costs and revenues should follow the
same pattern which is predetermined by the inflation rate.
What these examples have in common is that a researcher investigates some
object with unknown attributes which she values. The researcher can investigate
the attributes, and after learning one or more of their values she can either accept
the object (buy, launch investment, etc.) or decline. Then the decision about the
optimal investigation procedure is based on two factors: (i) utility concern, which
is the value of a particular attribute for the researcher; (ii) informational concern,
which is how knowing the true value of one attribute may provide information
about the other.
If one attribute functionally determines the value of the other, it might be
optimal to research the former first to save on further investigation costs, even
if it is not particularly important from a utility point of view. More generally,
if knowing the value of one attribute generates some information about another
attribute, then an interesting search issue appears.
One of the obvious particular cases of this situation is when a customer wants
to buy a bundle of goods and the price of each good is unknown (here prices play
the role of attributes in the indirect utility function). This situation is quite well-
studied in the literature. Burdett and Malueg (1981) and Carlson and McAfee
(1984) studied optimal search rules for several commodities given various recall
assumptions. However, in their setup the customer observes the entire price
vector once she enters the store. Anglin (1990) pointed out that though the
goods are consumed jointly, the customer can make a disjoint search for prices.
Unfortunately all the results in the multicommodity search literature are based
on the assumption of independent price distributions which makes it impossible
to study the informational aspect of the problem. In reality searching for prices
within a store is costly, and prices of different goods can be correlated. The
customer’s optimal search decision then can be based on informational concerns.
This chapter attempts to cover this gap in the literature.
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Moreover, most of consumer search literature (see, for example, Kohn and
Shavell (1974)) assumes that the consumer who searches learns the exact value
of the good. This is not a very realistic assumption: quite often the true value
of a good is revealed to the customer after the purchase, because a thorough
investigation of all the characteristics of the good is too time consuming and
costly. Hey and McKenna (1981) study such a model with two characteristics:
price and quality. However, in their model the search costs for the quality are
infinite, it cannot be explored prior to purchase. In our setup decision whether
to investigate the value of “quality” prior to purchase or not is endogenous.
To focus on the value of information, we develop a simple model. First, we
study a research process with one object. The object possesses two random at-
tributes with a known joint distribution1. The researcher can investigate these
attributes sequentially at some cost. We study how the dependency between the
attributes affects the optimal search (investigation) decision. To facilitate the
analysis we consider a situation where each attribute can take either an accept-
able or an unacceptable value and the researcher accepts the object only if both
attributes are acceptable. Moreover, the utility function is symmetric between the
attributes to eliminate the utility concern and so are the research costs. Symme-
try of the utility function allows me to concentrate on the informational concern
mentioned above. Finally, we consider a specific class of probability measures,
such that the expectation and the variance of utility are constant for all measures
in the class.
We characterize the optimal investigation rule, which is quite counterintuitive:
it is optimal to first investigate the attribute with the lowest probability of taking
on an acceptable value. After that we show that any probability distribution
which is asymmetric between the attributes is preferred by the searcher to the
symmetric one. Moreover, changes in seemingly absolutely irrelevant information
can be crucial for search behaviour, i.e. probabilities of unacceptable values of the
attributes (given constant utility and risk), in other words probabilities of various
outcomes when the searcher would not accept the good anyway. In particular,
1The study of objects with n attributes is also possible. However, it requires an optimization
over all possible search sequences which is a problem of combinatorial complexity. Analysis of
the n = 2 case shows the main ideas without obscuring them with algebraic complications.
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the researcher may switch from non-researching to research, which in the case of
consumer search may result in a purchase.
We also consider what would happen if there are multiple objects. Say Mr.
Abramovich wants to buy a football club, he considers a few clubs in Premier
League and each club varies in players and fan base. Weitzman (1979) derived the
optimal search rule for objects with different distributions. The results of a single
object search problem can be generalized using the same logic as Weitzman. The
optimal search rule between the objects is characterized by reservation values,
while within the object the researcher should follow the results developed for the
single object. Moreover, once the researcher starts to investigate one object she
never switches to another one unless she discover an unacceptable value of some
attribute.
The structure of the paperchapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the model
of the object with two attributes. Analysis the of single object case is presented in
section 3, the investigation process with multiple objects is considered in section 4.
Section 5 concludes. An interested reader can find the analysis of the continuous
case of the model in the appendix.
5.2 Single Object: A Model
The object has two attributes: a ∈ {A,A} and b ∈ {B,B} which affect the
researcher’s utility. Thus, there are four possible types of the object. Each type
can appear with a certain probability. The researcher is only interested in the
object of type AB, i.e. then both the attributes take acceptable values. The
utility function is symmetric, so the researcher values objects of type AB and
AB equally, and has no utility grounds to prefer investigation of attribute a to
attribute b.
The structure of the model is represented by the following two matrices.
Specification of the utility function is summarized by the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 5.2.1. u(AB) = u2, u(AB) = u(BA) = u1, u(A,B) = u0 with
u2 > 0 > u1 ≥ u0.
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Utilities
B B
A u2 u1
A u1 u0
Probabilities
B B
A α γ
A δ β
Utilities in the matrix are net of price (investments, etc.) After at least one
attribute has been investigated the researcher can either accept or reject the
object. If the object is rejected, the researcher gets reservation utility which we
assume to be equal zero, if it is accepted she gets the utility corresponding to the
type of the object.
Probabilities of the outcomes are presented in the above probability matrix.
At cost c the researcher can investigate whether ω ∈ A (if not then obviously
ω ∈ A), and then we say that she investigates attribute a. For the same cost she
can investigate whether ω ∈ B, and then we say that she investigates attribute
b.
To avoid utility-specific effects we consider a specific class of probability mea-
sures, which is characterized by constant probabilities of outcomes AB and AB.
Definition 5.2.2. Let M(α, β) be the class of probability measures such that
P (AB) = α, P (AB) = β, α+ β < 1.
Lemma 5.2.3. For any probability measure µ ∈M(α, β)
Eu = αu2 + (1− α− β)u1 + βu0 (5.2.1)
Var(u) = α(u2 − Eu)2 + (1− α− β)(u1 − Eu)2 + β(u0 − Eu)2 (5.2.2)
Therefore, all µ ∈ M(α, β) are characterized by the same expected utility
and risk. Thus, focusing on symmetric utility functions and µ ∈ M(α, β) allows
me to study the impact of information and dependencies on the investigator’s
behaviour.
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5.3 Single Object: Analysis
The expectation and the variance of utility do not depend on (γ, δ). If (α, β)
are fixed, the model is characterized by one degree of freedom γ (since δ =
1− α− β − γ).
Intuitively, it seems that the value of γ should not play a relevant role in the
model, since:
1. whatever the value of γ is, both expected utility and risk are constant;
2. changing the value of γ corresponds to changing the probabilities of two
events with the same level of utility;
3. changing the value of γ corresponds to changing the probabilities of two
events with negative utility, i.e. events when the searcher does not accept
the object.
However, given that investigation of the attributes is possible, the intuition
that the value of γ is irrelevant is incorrect. To illustrate this we derive an optimal
investigation rule, and show that it heavily depends on γ, namely on how far the
value of γ stays form the symmetric case γ0 = δ0 =
1−α−β
2
. The value of γ drives
not only the optimal investigation order but sometimes can influence the decision
whether to start research at all.
Consider a rational research process. Suppose the researcher decides first to
investigate an attribute a. She pays c and observes whether the object is of type
A or A. In the latter case it is optimal to terminate the investigation and reject
the object, because the best she can get is u1 < 0. In the former case she can
either accept the object immediately or investigate an attribute b. If she decides
to proceed, she pays c and observes b. If b = B she accepts, and if b = B she
rejects. Thus, given the optimal behaviour, the value of the investigation process
started with the attribute a denoted as Va can be written as
Va = −c+ P (A)max(P (B|A)u2 + P (B|A)u1, P (B|A)(u2 − c) + P (B|A)(−c))
(5.3.1)
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Or equivalently
Va = −c+max(αu2 + γu1, α(u2 − c)− cγ) (5.3.2)
If the investigation order is to first investigate b and then a, the value of the
investigation process denoted as Vb is:
Vb = −c+max(αu2 + (1− α− β − γ)u1, α(u2 − c)− c(1− α− β − γ)) (5.3.3)
This allows me to formulate the following result:
Theorem 5.3.1 (Optimal investigation rule). The optimal investigation rule
is:
• if max(αu2+ γu1, α(u2− c)− cγ, αu2+(1−α− β− γ)u1, α(u2− c)− c(1−
α− β − γ)) < c then do not search;
• otherwise:
– if γ < 1−α−β
2
it is optimal to investigate a first;
– if γ > 1−α−β
2
it is optimal to investigate b first;
– if γ = 1−α−β
2
both investigation orders yield the same expected utility;
– if the researcher knows that the object is of type A then it is optimal
to investigate the object further if u1 <
−c(α+γ)
γ
, and to terminate the
investigation and accept the object otherwise;
– if the researcher knows the object is of type B then it is optimal to
invetigate the object further if u1 <
−c(1−β−γ)
1−α−β−γ and to terminate the
investigation and accept the object otherwise;
– if after the first investigation the researcher realizes that the object is
either of type A or B then it is optimal to terminate the investigation
and refrain from accepting.
Proof. The proof comes naturally from comparing the benefits in different cases.
If max(Va, Vb) < 0 then it is optimal not to search. By expanding this inequality
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we get max(αu2 + γu1, α(u2− c)− cγ, αu2 + (1− α− β − γ)u1, α(u2− c)− c(1−
α− β − γ)) < c.
If max(Va, Vb) > 0 then it is optimal to investigate the attributes in the order
which gives the highest expected value. Thus, if Va > Vb it is optimal to start
with a. Va > Vb if and only if γ <
1−α−β
2
. If an attribute a was investigated
and a = A then it is optimal to terminate the search because u0 < u1 < 0.
The same holds for b. If a = A, then it is optimal to continue the research if
αu2+ γu1 < α(u2− c)− cγ, or equivalently u1 < −c(α+γ)γ . The analysis for b = B
is exactly the same.
Note that the optimal investigation rule possesses quite a counterintuitive
property: it is optimal to investigate an attribute with the lowest probability of
taking on a positive value. Indeed, the probability of a = A is α + γ, and the
probability b = B is 1−β−γ. It is optimal to investigate a first when γ < 1−α−β
2
which implies that α + γ < 1 − β − γ. The idea behind this fact is that the
researcher sacrifices the high probability of a positive outcome in the first step
for a more favorable probability distribution in the next step. In the case when it
is optimal to explore both attributes before accepting the object the idea which
drives the result is quite clear: the researcher tries to minimize the expected
costs of investigation and therefore maximizes the probability to stop after the
first investigation round. In the case when it is optimal to stop just after the
first round (in some cases the second search can be simply prohibited due to lack
of time, etc.) pure informational concerns play role: the researcher faces more
favourable distribution in the second round (maximizes the probability of correct
choice) at the cost of lower a probability in the first round.
It is important to emphasize that the value of γ affects the optimal investi-
gation rule. Thus this information is not irrelevant given that investigation of
the object is possible. Theorem 5.3.1 shows how the value of γ affects the op-
timal investigation order. The following proposition illustrates the importance
of this information for the customer’s preferences over distributions and welfare.
Let’s denote the value of the search process by V (γ) = max(Va(γ), Vb(γ), 0), and
γ0 =
1−α−β
2
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Proposition 5.3.2. For any µ ∈ M(α, β) V (γ) ≥ V (γ0). If γ2 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ0 or
γ2 ≥ γ1 ≥ γ0 then V (γ2) ≥ V (γ1).
Proof. Note that Va(γ0) = Vb(γ0) and Va is a decreasing function of γ, while
Vb is an increasing. Therefore max(Va(γ), Vb(γ)) ≥ max(Va(γ0), Vb(γ0)). In the
same way, since either Va(γ2) ≥ Va(γ1) or Vb(γ2) ≥ Vb(γ1), the value of search
V (γ2) ≥ V (γ1).
Thus the researcher would prefer to have an asymmetric distribution to a
symmetric one, and the more asymmetric the better. The reason is that given a
positive outcome of investigation of the first attribute, the quality of information
increases and the conditional probability distribution becomes more favorable. If
the researcher prefers say extremely low values of γ to moderate ones it is rea-
sonable to assume that for some γ close to γ0 it is optimal not to search and
to get reservation utility of zero, while for extreme values of γ it is optimal to
start research and probably accept the object (buy the good, launch the invest-
ments). Thus, the seemingly irrelevant γ can dramatically affect the researcher’s
behaviour. Formally this result is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3.3. There is a pair (c, γ) such that V (γ) > 0 > V (γ0).
Proof. First, note that Va(γ0) = Vb(γ0). By expanding the expression of the value
of the search we get that V (γ0) < 0 if c > max
(
αu2 + γ0u1,
u2
1+α+γ0
)
. Note, that
the right hand side of this expression is a decreasing continuous function of γ.
Therefore it is possible to choose c and γ in such a way that
max
(
αu2 + γu1,
u2
1 + α+ γ
)
> c > max
(
αu2 + γ0u1,
u2
1 + α+ γ0
)
with V (γ) > 0.
Thus, the value of γ affects the optimal research order and sometimes can
affect the decision to investigate itself. The researcher prefers probability distri-
butions which are further from symmetric ones.
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5.4 Multiple Objects
A search problem with multiple objects can be quite interesting. For example, in
times of crisis a major financial company decides to take over one of the banks
which has experienced some trouble. Each bank can be characterized by multi-
ple attributes which affect the final decision. What is the optimal investigation
rule? Weitzman (1979) showed that it is optimal to explore objects in order of
reservation values. However, if each of the objects has a complex structure and
there is a possibility to investigate the object itself, the reservation value has to
be redefined. A situation when one object is partially explored (one attribute is
known) deserves a particular interest. We show that it is never optimal to stop
investigation and switch to another object if the attribute explored has a positive
value. This section provides a study of the attribute search problem with multiple
objects.
Assume there are multiple objects which satisfy the assumptions described
above, i.e. they posses symmetric attributes (which in principle can be dif-
ferent in nature between objects). Then each object is characterized by a set
(u1i, u2i, u3i, αi, βi, γi, ci), i = 1, n is the object index. Attributes are independent
between objects. Let Vi = max(Vai, Vbi) be an expected value given the optimal
order of search of the attributes. For simplicity of notation assume that it is
optimal to investigate a first for all the objects. and thus Vi = Via. Of course,
attributes can be renamed in such a way that this holds for each object.
Assume that the researcher has some “sure thing” as a result of previous
search, and denote it by zi. Assume by now that only object i is left unexplored.
Of course, if zi 6= 0 the value of investigation changes in part which deals with
reservation object. To take this into account let’s denote
V˜ai(zi) = −ci +max(αiu2i + γiu1i, αi(u2i − ci) + (zi − ci)γi) (5.4.1)
V˜bi(zi) = −ci +max(αiu2i + δiu1i, αi(u2i − ci) + (zi − ci)δi) (5.4.2)
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where δi = 1− αi − βi − γi. It is clear that if Vai ≥ Vbi then V˜ai(zi) ≥ V˜bi(zi)
for all zi and vice versa. If she searches object i in the optimal way the expected
benefits equal
max(V˜ai(zi + P (A)izi, V˜bi + P (B)izi) (5.4.3)
Note that from theorem 5.3.1 it follows that if Vai ≥ Vbi then P (A)i ≥ P (B)i.
Therefore, since zi ≥ 0
max(V˜ai(zi) + P (A)izi, V˜bi(zi) + P (B)izi) = V˜ai(zi) + P (A)izi
The researcher is indifferent between researching and non-researching if V˜ai(zi)+
P (A)izi = zi. Therefore each object is characterized by the reservation value
zi = max
(
αiu2i + γiu1i − ci
αi + γi
,
αiu2i − (1 + αi + γi)ci
αi
)
(5.4.4)
Weitzman (1979) proved that it is optimal to search objects in the order of
reservation values: from the highest zi in descending order. Note that the search
order in general is different from the order of expected values given the optimal
search {Vi}ni=1, so it can be that Vi > Vj but it is still optimal to search j before
i.
It is clear that if object i is searched and an unacceptable value of an attribute
is discovered, it is optimal to search another object or to terminate search if no
object are left. But what if the first attribute takes the acceptable value? Let’s
denote a reservation value after a positive outcome in the first round (a = A) by
z˜i. If it is optimal to terminate the search and buy without looking at attribute
b then z˜istop =
αiu2i+γiu1i−ci
αi+γi
. If it is optimal to search for b before buying, object
i is characterized by new reservation value z˜i is defined by:
αiu2i
αi + γi
+
γiz˜i
αi + γi
− ci = z˜i (5.4.5)
and then
z˜ib =
αiu2i − ci(αi + γi)
αi
(5.4.6)
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Therefore
z˜i = max
(
αiu2i + γiu1i
αi + γi
,
αiu2i − (αi + γi)ci
αi
)
(5.4.7)
Lemma 5.4.1. If a = A, it is optimal either to terminate the search and accept
the object, or search for another attribute of the same object.
Proof. The lemma holds if z˜i > zi, which is true because
αiu2i + γiu1i
αi + γi
>
αiu2i + γiu1i − ci
αi + γi
and
αiu2i − (αi + γi)ci
αi
>
αiu2i − (1 + αi + γi)ci
αi
The lemma shows that once the searcher has got a positive search result about
characteristic a, the reservation value of the object is not decreasing and therefore
it is optimal to search this object further. This allows me to formulate the optimal
search rule for multicommodity research.
Theorem 5.4.2 (Optimal investigation rule with multiple objects). The
optimal investigation rule is:
• start with the object with the highest zi;
• if max(αiu2i+ γiu1i, αi(u2i− ci)− ciγi, αiu2i+ (1−αi− βi− γi)u1i, αi(u2i−
ci)− ci(1− αi − βi − γi)) < ci, then terminate the investigation;
• otherwise:
– if γi <
1−αi−βi
2
it is optimal to investigate a first;
– if γi >
1−αi−βi
2
it is optimal to investigate b first;
– if γi =
1−αi−βi
2
both research orders yield the same expected utility;
– if the researcher knows that the object is of type A, then it is optimal to
investigate further if u1i <
−ci(αi+γi)
γi
and to terminate the investigation
and accept the object otherwise;
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– if the searcher knows that object is of type B, then it is optimal to in-
vestigate further if u1i <
−ci(1−βi−γi)
1−αi−βi−γi and to terminate the investigation
and accept the object otherwise;
– if after the first investigation the researcher realizes that the object is
either of type A or B then it is optimal proceed with the object with
the highest zi among the objects left or to terminate the investigation
if there are no more objects.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter illustrates the importance of information contained in one attribute
of a good about another one. Even if two probability distributions provide the
same expected utility and risk, the researcher might prefer one over another if she
possesses the possibility of investigation of the attributes. Moreover, a change in
the probability distribution which preserves the mean and variance of utility and
only affects probabilities of outcomes when the researcher does not accept the
object can dramatically affect her behaviour. She may switch from passive non-
investigating (and hence rejection of the object) behaviour to active investigation,
which might result in the acceptence of the object: purchase of a good, launching
an investment project. The results can be illustrated for different distributions
and utility functions, and the interested reader can find the continuous case with
a uniform distribution in the appendix. The model allows one to consider the
investigation problem with several heterogeneous objects, and the results preserve
all essential properties of the single object solution. The results of the chapter can
potentially be embedded in an equilibrium setup, when the firms make decisions
about characteristics of the products (say, price and quality) or prices of two
goods.
Appendix
For the sake of simplicity, in the main body of this chapter we restricted myself
to the case where characteristics take binary values. However A and A can be
considered as two regions where the utility function takes different signs. Here
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we show that though utility may not be constant over these regions, the analysis
and results stay essentially the same. To do this we look at a continuous case:
each attribute is a continuous variable bounded between zero and one.
Consider an example where attributes can take continuous values. Let (x, y) ∈
[0, 1]2 be a characteristic space and u = xy−p be a utility function, where p < 1/2
is the price of the good. Initially we assume that (x, y) are uniformly distributed.
It is obvious that if one of the characteristics is less then p, the researcher is
never going to accept the object. Let us transform the probability distribution
in this area in the following way: we set P(x ≤ p, y ≥ p) = 0 and double density
for x ≥ p, y ≤ p. See the figure for details.
Figure 5.1: Values of density function and reservation utility level
-
6
p
p
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1
y
x
0 1
1 2
As before, assume that the researcher is allowed to investigate only one at-
tribute, and then he has to make a decision.
1. x is investigated first, then y.
(a) Given value of x density functions for y are:
• x ≤ p
f(y) =
{
1/p if y ≤ p
0 if y > p
(5.5.1)
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• x > p
f(y) =
{ 2
1+p
if y ≤ p
1
1+p
if y > p
(5.5.2)
(b) The expected value of utility function conditional on x is:
• x ≤ p
Eu =
1
p
∫ p
0
(xy − p) dy = p
2
x− p < 0 (5.5.3)
• x > p
Eu =
1
1 + p
∫ 1
0
(xy − p) dy + 1
1− p
∫ p
0
(xy − p) dy
=
1
1 + p
[
1 + p2
2
x− (p+ p2)
] (5.5.4)
Note, that the object is accepted only if expected utility is greater
than 0, therefore
x >
2(p+ p2)
1 + p2
(5.5.5)
and the RHS is greater than p.
(c) The density function of x is
f(x) =
{
p if x ≤ p
1 + p if x > p
(5.5.6)
(d) Expected utility of research equals to
Eu = (1 + p)
∫ 1
2(p+p2)
1+p2
1
1 + p
[
1 + p2
2
x− (p+ p2)
]
dx
=
(1− 2p− p2)2
4(1 + p2)
(5.5.7)
2. y is investigated first, then x.
(a) Given the value of y the density functions for x are:
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• y ≤ p
f(x) =
{ 1
2−p if x ≤ p
2
2−p if x > p
(5.5.8)
• y > p
f(x) =
{
0 if x ≤ p
1
1−p if x > p
(5.5.9)
(b) The expected value of utility function conditional on y is:
• y ≤ p
Eu =
1
2− p
∫ 1
0
(xy − p) dx+ 1
2− p
∫ 1
p
(xy − p) dx
=
1
2− p
[
2− p2
2
y − (2p− p2)
]
< 0
(5.5.10)
• y > p
Eu =
1
1− p
∫ 1
p
(xy − p) dx = 1 + p
2
y − p (5.5.11)
Note, that the object is accepted only if expected utility is greater
than 0, therefore
y >
2p
1 + p
(5.5.12)
and the RHS is greater than p.
(c) The density function of y is
f(y) =
{
2− p if y ≤ p
1− p if y > p (5.5.13)
(d) Expected utility of search equals to
Eu =
1
1 + 2p
∫ 1
2p
1−p
[
1− p
2
y − p
]
dy
=
(1− p)3
4(1 + p)
(5.5.14)
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3. It is easy to check that
(1− p)3
4(1 + p)
>
(1− 2p− p2)2
4(1 + p2)
(5.5.15)
Thus, the key properties of the optimal investigation rule are preserved in the
continuous setup. The investigator still prefers to look at the attribute with the
lowest probability of an acceptable outcome first.
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Part II
Dynamic Competition and
Regualtion
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Chapter 6
Targeted Competition: Choosing
Your Enemies in Multiplayer
Games
6.1 Introduction
Competition lies at the heart of economics and has been studied extensively.
However, there is a class of competition mechanisms that abound in practice
but that, to the best of our knowledge, have not yet been studied specifically in
the literature – those are mechanisms providing a competitor with an ability to
target his rivals on an individual basis. We group such mechanisms under the
common label of targeted competition. The few examples that follow illustrate
how pervasive targeted competition is. On product markets, firms may decide to
develop a product that is closer along one characteristic to that of a particular
competitor. A multinational corporation may decide to invest relatively more
in a market shared with a particular rival (see, for example, surveys by Bailey
and Friedlaender, 1982; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1992; Lancaster, 1990). Another
example of targeted competition is comparative advertisement (see, for example,
Anderson et al., 2009; Barigozzi and Peitz, 2007), a practice of running ads that
directly compare one’s products to that of the rivals. Unethical practices, for
example launching fabricated lawsuits against specific rivals, provide further ways
to target competitors. Targeted competition is not restricted to economics only.
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Think about the ways political parties and politicians compete through their
support for specific programs, or how different governments try to protect local
industries through trade barriers. Finally, a warfare stays as an ultimate example
of selective competition.
Targeted competition includes a strategic consideration that does not arise
in non-targeted competition: a player (a firm, a political party, an army) can
influence the balance of powers among his rivals by choosing whom he competes
against; in turn, that determines how much this player wins or loses competing
with those rivals in the periods to come. In particular, one may intuitively expect
the weaker players to direct more resources towards fighting the strongest player
rather than fighting each other. Indeed, otherwise the strongest player stands a
good chance of forcing the weaker ones out of the game (as time goes by).
Any model of targeted competition should have the following two characteris-
tics: 1) there should be three players or more – otherwise the competition cannot
be targeted; and 2) the analysis should be dynamic – the aforementioned strate-
gic consideration can be only studied in a dynamic setting. The closest matching
strand of the literature then is that of dynamic oligopoly models. Though many
scenarios of dynamic competition are studied (inventories (Kirman and Sobel,
1974), evolution of sales (Dockner and Jrgensen, 1988), varying profit opportuni-
ties (Ericson and Pakes, 1995), collusion behaviour (Fershtman and Pakes, 2000),
etc.), targeted competition is not part of the analysis. This chapter aims to be a
first step towards filling this gap.
We develop a model of targeted competition that does not focus on case-
specific aspects of competition but rather focuses on the general ability to target
in competition. Each player in the model is characterized by his relative power –
the amount of resources this player has. The power of a player can be distributed
to fight each of the player’s rivals. We first show that myopic players prefer to fight
more with their weakest opponent. Consequently, the strongest player grows in
power and eventually outcompetes the weaker players. Vice versa, we show that,
if players are non-myopic and do not discount future payoffs too much, then the
weaker players concentrate more on fighting their strongest opponent (provided
no player is too strong to start with). Consequently, the strongest player becomes
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weaker over time and all the players converge in power to a common level and
survive.
It is tempting to view the fact that weaker players focus on fighting with the
stronger player together as a form of tacit collusion. It is, however, conceptu-
ally different. Whereas collusive behaviour in repeated games is sustained by
the credible threat that other players will punish deviation away from collusion,
the equilibrium concept of our game is Markov perfect equilibrium, hence the
strategies do not depend upon past actions and so there are no strategies with
retrospective punishment. In our case it is the dynamic structure of the game
that pushes the weaker players to fight together against the stronger one: if they
are to prefer fighting each other for the sake of immediate gains, then the power
of the strongest player will grow up to the point at which, eventually, he can
outcompete his rivals. If this threat of losing the game is large enough, then the
weaker players will fight more against the strongest player and their behaviour
will be alike to that of tacit collusion.
There are two related games that have been studied in the literature: colonel
Blotto games (see, e.g., Roberson, 2006) and truel games (Kilgour, 1971).
A colonel Blotto game is a game between two players that share several bat-
tlefields. Each player divides his army between the battlefields, a battlefield is
won by the larger force, a player who wins more battlefields wins the game. The
game of targeted competition that we study can be viewed as a game of three
players and three battlefields, where each pair of players share a battlefield and
where there is no battlefield that is shared by all the players. Then the similarity
of our game to colonel Blotto games is the ability of the players to choose how
to split their powers against their opponents. The main differences are: 1) there
are three players in our game, 2) our game is dynamic – the winner is not deter-
mined at once, rather the winner of this round becomes stronger and the game
continues.
A truel game is an extension of a duel game. There are three players, each with
a gun. Each round each player chooses whom to shoot and kills his opponent with
a certain chance that depends upon his skill; if two or more players are still alive
the game continues. Like in our game, there is a choice of the opponent, there
are dynamics and there is a consideration that killing a certain player influences
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your chance of survival in the rounds to come. The main differences are: 1) in
our game the payoff of the game is a discounted sum of the payoffs in each round,
so each round is valuable, whereas in a truel game the payoff is 1 if the player
survives and 0 otherwise; 2) in our game if the player is “shot”, he does not die
at once but rather becomes relatively weaker; 3) in a truel game a player chooses
to fight either one opponent or the other, whereas in our game a player chooses
how much to fight one opponent and how much to fight the other (a continuous
choice).
So, our game has structural similarities to those of colonel Blotto and truel
games, but we think the named differences make our model more appropriate for
the aforementioned examples of targeted competition.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents
the model, which is inspired by the above examples about targeted competition
between firms. Section three considers the simple case of myopic players and
shows that only the strongest player survives as time goes by. In section four,
we show that if players are not myopic, the discount factor is sufficiently small
and if no player is too strong, then there is an equilibrium where all the players
converge in power and remain in the game. The last section concludes.
6.2 Setup
There are three players, 1, 2, and 3 – firms, political parties, armies, etc. The
players are involved in a dynamic competitive game. Each player i at time t ∈
[0,∞) is characterised by a state variable xi(t) being the amount of resources he
can use in competition with his rivals at time t. We call this variable the “power”
of player i. It can be the market share of a firm, the amount of personnel the firm
has, how large and how good its credit resources are or how well the managers
are connected; it can be the electoral base or the number of seats in parliament;
it can be the number of military units.
For convenience, let x = (x1, x2, x3). The initial state is normalised so that∑
i xi(0) = 1 (later on we will see that
∑
i xi(t) = 1 for any t) and also no player
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is too strong to start with. Formally, x0 ∈ X, where
X =
{
x ∈ R3
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
xi = 1, xi <
2
5
∀i
}
(6.2.1)
Each player can fight by targeting his rivals. yij denotes the amount of power
player i uses to fight against player j. We consider Markov strategies, i.e. the
actions of the players are conditioned upon the state of the game, so yij are
functions of x. Our choice is determined by the main idea of the chapter: we
argue that collusive type of behaviour can arise even in Markov strategies, i.e.
without threat of punishment from the other player.
For convenience, let y1 = (y12, y13), y2 = (y21, y23), y3 = (y31, y32) and y =
(y1, y2, y3).
Each player uses all his power to fight his opponents1 and what amount he
uses can not be negative, therefore
yi ∈ Yi(x)
Yi(x) =
{
yi
∣∣∣ yij ≥ 0,∑
j
yij = xi
} (6.2.2)
Every “battle” between players i and j has two consequences: 1) the players
receive instantaneous payoffs from the battle, 2) their powers change. The in-
stantaneous payoffs can be, for example: profits in case of firms, or the salary and
the bonus payments of a top manager; political contributions in case of political
parties; access to natural resources in case of warfare for economic reasons.
The instantaneous payoffs for player i when he is fighting player j are given by
ϕ(yij, yji), where 1) ϕ(0, yji) = 0, i.e. if a player doesn’t fight, his instantaneous
payoffs are always zero; 2) ϕ(yij, yji) is strictly increasing in yij and for yij > 0
it is strictly decreasing in yji; 3) ϕ(yij, yji) is strictly concave in yij (decreasing
marginal returns).
Virtually the only class of differential games which allows analytical solutions
are linear-quadratic games (see Lockwood (1996)). Therefore, to have an ana-
lytical solution to our model we take a quadratic specification for ϕ. A general
1In our model there are no alternative costs associated with fighting, therefore it is always
optimal to use for fighting all the power.
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quadratic specification that would also satisfy our assumptions on the relevant
domain (0 ≤ yij ≤ 1, 0 ≤ yji ≤ 1) is
ϕ(yij, yji) = (a− b1yij − b2yji)yij (6.2.3)
where b1 > 0, b2 > 0 and a ≥ 2b1 + b2. To simplify matters we take b1 = b2 = b,
so
ϕ(yij, yji) = (a− b(yij + yji))yij (6.2.4)
where b > 0 and a ≥ 3b.
Let pii(y) denote the sum of all the instantaneous payoffs that player i receives
from fighting his opponents with pii(y). We have
pii(y) =
∑
j 6=i
ϕ(yij, yji) (6.2.5)
Per se, the power does not enter the instantaneous payoff function. However,
becoming more powerful will yield higher payoffs as more power can be used
competing with the rivals thus improving the outcomes of that competition.
If x(t) reaches the boundary of X, the game ends. T denotes the ending time.
Formally,
T = inf{t ≥ 0 |x(t) /∈ X} (6.2.6)
If the game never ends, then T =∞.
If the game ends, each player i receives a terminal payoffs Si, the strongest
player wins, the weaker players loose:
Si(x) =
{
M if xi > xj ∀j 6= i
0 otherwise
(6.2.7)
where M > 0. If the game ends and two of the players are equally strong, they
both loose (this assumption is not important for the results).
The rationale for ending the game if the boundary of X is approached is as
follows. If one of the players becomes sufficiently strong, it is reasonable to expect
him to eventually outcompete his rivals. To simplify the game we stop it at this
time and assign a strictly positive payoff of M to the strongest player and a zero
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payoff to the weaker players.1 As we will see later on, the results do not depend
upon the size of M as long as M is positive, still it is helpful to think of it as of
a payoff that is higher than what the strongest player could have got if he was to
continue the competition. Loosing, on the other hand, means that a player quits
the game (a firm looses its markets, etc) and the stream of the instantaneous
payoffs ends – so loosing yields zero payoff.
The payoff for the whole game is the discounted stream of the instantaneous
payoffs plus the discounted terminal payoff, so the payoff for player i is
Ui =
∫ T
0
e−δtpii(y(x(t)))dt+ e−δTSi(x(T )) (6.2.8)
where δ is a discount factor.
If player i fights player j more than player j fights player i (yij > yji), then
player i becomes more powerful, while player j becomes less powerful. We call
such dynamics a power shift. For example, if a company invests more in a market
than its rival does, its customer base shall increase relatively to that of the rival; if
a political party supports a certain program more than its rival does, its electoral
base shall increase relatively to that of the rivalling party, etc. We assume these
dynamics to be linear in y:
x˙i(t) = fi(y(x(t)))
fi(y) =
∑
j 6=i
(yij − yji) k (6.2.9)
where k > 0 stands for the power shift intensity.
We note here that from
∑
i xi(0) = 1 and from (6.2.9) it follows that
∑
i xi(t) =
1 for all t.
So, our setup is a differential game with simultaneous play (see Dockner et al.,
2000) and we restrict our attention to Markov strategies. The strategies are
functions y(x) satisfying (6.2.2), the state variables x evolve according to (6.2.9)
and the objective functions are given by (6.2.8).
1From x ∈ X it follows that xi > 15 , so a player i dies if xi(t) reaches 15 . An alternative
specification is to say that a player i dies, e.g. a firm goes bankrupt, a political party dissolves,
if xi(t) reaches 0 at some t. Such a specification seems to yield similar results, but requires a
numerical solution (see the discussion at the end of section 6.4.2), so we have chosen against
this latter specification.
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6.3 Example: Cournot Competition
In the previous section we did not consider specific cases of targeted competition,
rather we argued for a setup that can suit cases ranging from spatial competition
among firms to warfare. In this section we show, with a particular example, that
our setup can also stem from targeted Cournot competition with binding capacity
constraints.
Suppose there are three universities and three areas (e.g. economics, man-
agement and sociology). Suppose that each university is active in two areas only
– has two respective departments – and in each area there are only two active
universities. Each university i is characterised by the number of professors, xi,
which the university can split between its departments,
∑
i xi = 1. Let yij denote
the number of professors of university i that are in the same area as professors of
university j,
∑
j 6=i yij = xi.
The amount of education a university department provides is proportional
to the number of professors employed, we take the proportionality coefficient to
be one.1 For example, university 1 employs y12 professors in economics and y13
professors in sociology, so the supply of education by this university is y12 and
y13 respectively. As for the demand, suppose it is the same in all the areas and is
given by Y = 1
b
(a−P ), where P is the admission price and Y is the total amount
of education demanded.
Suppose the universities compete a la Cournot and let us neglect the costs for
simplicity. Then the profits of university i from an area shared with university j
are given by
ϕ(yij, yji) = P (yij + yji) · yij = (a− b(yij + yji))yij (6.3.1)
We additionally suppose that the demand for education is high compared to the
number of professors to the extend that a ≥ 3b (in general terms, the capacity
constraints are binding).
Finally suppose that as time goes by, the professors of different universities
interact with each other within the same areas and tend to change their appoint-
ments toward the larger departments (for reasons of richer environment, better
1We are free to measure education in any units.
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specialisation, etc). If we take these dynamics to be linear, then we get
x˙i =
∑
j 6=i
(yij − yji) k (6.3.2)
So, we have presented an example of targeted Cournot competition that yields
the same game structure, same instantaneous payoffs and same dynamics as in
our model. If we further restrict the dynamics to X (a university has to close
down if it becomes too small), then this example yields precisely our model.
Real life situations of targeted Cournot competition would be more complex,
of course, but a simple example of three players is sufficient to study the impli-
cations of an ability to target particular competitors.
6.4 Analysis
We consider two cases: a case with myopic players and a general case. In both
cases we solve our game for a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) and analyse the
resulting equilibrium dynamics.
In what follows we denote the best response strategies with y˜ and the equi-
librium strategies with yˆ.
6.4.1 Myopic Players
The players are myopic if they focus on the current gains only. For a myopic
player i the payoff of the game at time t is
Ui(t) = pii(y(x(t))) (6.4.1)
The dynamics of the myopic case are summarised by the following proposition
(we limit our attention to a general initial state, when one of the players is strictly
stronger than the rest).
Proposition 6.4.1. Suppose, without a loss of generality, that x1(0) > x2(0),
x1(0) > x3(0). Then there exists a unique MPE. Moreover, the equilibrium dy-
namics are such that the game ends and the strongest player wins, i.e. T < ∞
and x1(T ) > x2(T ), x1(T ) > x3(T )
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Proof. Maximising Ui(t) in (yij, yik) w.r.t. yij + yik = xi gives a unique best
response
y˜ij(x) =
xi
2
+
yki(x)− yji(x)
4
(6.4.2)
(a boundary solution is also possible but it is straightforward to check that it is
never attained for x ∈ X).
Given the above best response functions we can solve for a unique equilibrium
point. We get
yˆij(x) =
xi
2
+
xk − xj
10
(6.4.3)
As we are considering Markov strategies, (6.4.3) constitutes a unique Markov
perfect equilibrium.
Plugging (6.4.3) into (6.2.9) and using x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 gives
x˙i(t) =
9k
5
(
xi(t)− 1
3
)
(6.4.4)
As x ∈ X, x1(0) > x2(0) and x1(0) > x3(0), we have that x1(0) > 1/3 and
x2,3 < 1/3. Consequently, x1(t) grows over time and
x˙1(t) ≥ 9k
5
(
xi(0)− 1
3
)
> 0 (6.4.5)
while x2(t) and x3(t) decline. Since x˙1(t) is bounded from below, x(t) eventually
reaches the boundary of X, the game ends and x1(T ) > xi(T ) for i 6= 1.
This case illustrates the intuition that if the players are myopic and pursue
only their instantaneous payoffs then they may have no incentives to fight more
against the stronger player. As a consequence, the weaker players loose.
6.4.2 Forward-looking Players
If the players are myopic, then the weaker players loose in the equilibrium. The
question is, if the players are sufficiently non myopic, i.e. if δ is sufficiently small
so that the players value their future profits high enough, will it be the case the
dynamics are reversed? We give a positive answer to this question.
Proposition 6.4.2. If δ < 4k
3
, then there exists an MPE such that for all i
xi(t)→ 13 as t→∞.
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Proof. We prove the proposition by construction: we state an equilibrium candi-
date possesing the property that xi(t)→ 13 and then check that it is an equilibrium
indeed. Let
yˆij(x) =
xi + c(xk − xj)
2
(6.4.6)
c =
1
18
(
5
δ
k
− 14−
√(
25
δ
k
− 76
)(
δ
k
− 4
) )
(6.4.7)
From
∑
i xi(t) = 1, from (6.2.9) and from (6.4.6) it follows that
x˙i(t) =
3k(c+ 1)
2
(
xi(t)− 1
3
)
(6.4.8)
If δ < 4k
3
, then from (6.4.7) it follows that c < −1. Consequently, from (6.4.8) it
follows that xi(t)→ 13 as t→∞.
Let us now prove that (6.4.6) constitute an MPE. To do so we need to show
that yˆi is a best response to yˆj and yˆk. All the possible strategies of player i can be
divided into two classes: those strategies that eventually end the game (T <∞)
– let it be class B, and those that do not (T = ∞) – class A. We proceed as
follows. First, we restrict the strategies of player i to class A and show that in
this class the strategy yˆi, as given by (6.4.6), is indeed a best response strategy.
Second, we extend this result to A ∪B.
So, let the strategies of player i be restricted to class A. Let us compute the
value function V of player i if every player follows strategy yˆ and if the game
starts at x(0) = x. Solving (6.4.8) gives
xi(t) =
(
xi − 1
3
)
e3k(c+1)/2·t +
1
3
(6.4.9)
Therefore (also using x1 + x2 + x3 = 1) we have
1
Vi(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δtpii(yˆ(x(t)))dt =
c1
(
xi − 1
3
)2
+ c2
(
xi − 1
3
)
+ c3 + c4(xk − xj)2 (6.4.10)
1See the appendix for the details of the derivation.
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where 
c1 =
b(3c− 1)
4(δ − 3k(c+ 1))
c2 =
12a+ b(3c− 5)
6(2δ − 3k(c+ 1))
c3 =
3a− b
9δ
c4 = − bc(3c− 1)
4(δ − 3k(c+ 1))
(6.4.11)
Consider now the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations:
yˆi(x) ∈ arg max
yi∈Yi(x)
(
pii(yi, yˆ−i(x)) +
∑
j
∂Vi(x)
∂xj
fj(yi, yˆ−i(x))
)
(6.4.12)
δVi(x) = pii(yˆ(x)) +
∑
j
∂Vi(x)
∂xj
fj(yˆ(x)) (6.4.13)
If these equations are satisfied for all x ∈ X, then yˆi is a best response to yˆ−i
(when the strategies of player i are limited to class A, so that x(t) never leaves
X) – see Dockner et al. (2000, chapters 3 and 4).
Equation (6.4.13) is automatically satisfied by the way V is constructed. We
now check equation (6.4.12). Let
g(yi, x) = pii(yi, yˆ−i(x)) +
∑
j
∂Vi(x)
∂xj
fj(yi, yˆ−i(x)) (6.4.14)
Using (6.4.6), (6.4.10) and the definitions for pii, fi to expand g(yi, x) and max-
imising the result w.r.t. yij + yik = xi gives
y˜ij(x) =
xi + d(xk − xj)
2
(6.4.15)
d =
1− c
4
− ck(3c− 1)
2(δ − 3k(c+ 1)) (6.4.16)
Strategy yˆi is a best response strategy if (6.4.6) coincides with (6.4.15), i.e. if
c = d. We check it now. Using (6.4.16) to expand c = d and simplifying gives
18c2 +
(
28− 10 δ
k
)
c+
(
2
δ
k
− 6
)
= 0 (6.4.17)
It is straightforward to check that c as defined in (6.4.7) is a solution to the above
equation. Hence c = d and yˆi is a best response.
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In principle, it is possible that a corner solution is obtained when maximising
g(yi, x), however it is never a case for x ∈ X.
Consider now an arbitrary strategy y`i(x) ∈ B. With a class B strategy the
game ends at some T (that is determined by yi(x)). Let
yni (x, t) =
{
y`i(x) if t ≤ T − n
yˆi(x) if t > T − n
(6.4.18)
where n is a sequence, n > 0 and limn→∞ n = 0. This strategy yni (x, t) belongs
to A, therefore it gives the same or a lower payoff than the best response strategy
yˆi(x), i.e.∫ ∞
0
e−δtpii(yˆ(x(t)))dt ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−δtpii(yn(x(t)))dt =∫ T−n
0
e−δtpii(y`(x(t)))dt+
∫ ∞
T−n
e−δtpii(yˆ(x(t)))dt (6.4.19)
Taking the limit as n→∞ gives∫ ∞
0
e−δtpii(yˆ(x(t)))dt ≥
∫ T
0
e−δtpii(y`(x(t)))dt+ Vi(x(T )) (6.4.20)
On the other hand, the payoff from employing strategy y`i(x) is∫ T
0
e−δtpii(y`(x(t)))dt+ Si(x(T )) (6.4.21)
Therefore, if Si(x(T )) ≤ Vi(x(T )), then yˆi is the optimal strategy in class A ∪B
as well.
As x(0) ∈ X, then from the definition ofX it follows that xi(0) < 25 . Whatever
the strategy y`(x) is, from (6.2.9), from (6.4.6) and from x1+x2+x3 = 1 it follows
that
x˙i(t) ≤ 3k(c+ 1)
2
(
xi(t)− 1
3
)
(6.4.22)
Consequently, x(T ) < 2
5
. At the same time, x(T ) belongs to the boundary of
X. So, if it was true that xi(T ) > xj(T ) for all j 6= i, then it should have been
that xi(T ) =
2
5
. As it is not, we have that xi(T ) ≤ xj(T ) for at least some
j 6= i. Therefore Si(x(T )) = 0. But from ϕ(yˆij(x), yˆji(x)) > 0 it follows that
Vi(x(T )) > 0.
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So, Si(x(T )) ≤ Vi(x(T )) and yˆi(x) is a best response strategy when all possible
strategies are considered (class A ∪B).
In words, a weaker player can choose a strategy to reach the boundary of X,
but doing so is not optimal. As for the strongest player, he may prefer to reach
the boundary if he is still the strongest player when he does so, but he cannot
achieve such dynamics if his rivals are playing the equilibrium strategies.
So, for a sufficiently small δ there is an equilibrium such that the strongest
player declines in his power while the weaker players improve in their powers.
Consequently, all the players converge. A notable property of this equilibrium is
that each player fights his strongest opponent more.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
Stackelberg (1952) has argued that a duopoly will never achieve an equilibrium
in price/quantity setting strategies. Moreover, the duopolists will engage into
fighting for leadership and, consequently, one of them will become predominantly
stronger in economic terms, or they will find it beneficial to collude.
“Duopoly is an unstable market form not only in the sense that price is apt to
be indeterminate, but much more because it is unlikely to remain as a market form
for any length of time. The inherent contradictions in the duopolistic situation
press for a solution through the adoption of another market form – monopoly”
We do not say a market of three will attain an equilibrium in prices or quanti-
ties. Such strategic variables may as well stay indeterminate. Rather we consider
the relative powers of the players. We show that if the three players are suffi-
ciently forward looking and if there are ways for them to target their rivals, then
everyone competes more against his stronger rival. Consequently the players con-
verge in their power, and oligopolistic competition is sustainable – it does not boil
down to a monopoly.
We have analysed but a basic setup of targeted competition and two possi-
ble extensions are worth mentioning – stochastic dynamics and multiple players.
Arguably, both extensions would bring the model closer to judging real life situ-
ations as outcomes of competition are scarcely deterministic and many examples
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we talked about (e.g., multiproduct firms) often involve more than three players.
The main question here will stay the same: given stochastic dynamics or given
multiple (more than three) players in the game will it be more difficult or more
easy for the weaker rivals to tacitly coordinate against the strongest one?
Appendix
Here we give a detailed derivation of (6.4.10), (6.4.11).
Let zi = xi − 13 . As x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, so z1 + z2 + z3 = 0. Next we derive pii(yˆ(z)).
First,
yˆij(x) =
xi + c(xk − xj)
2
=
zi + c(zk − zj)
2
+
1
6
(6.5.1)
Then (using
∑
i zi = 0 where appropriate)
pii(yˆ(z)) = (a− b(yˆij + yˆji))yˆij + (a− b(yˆik + yˆki))yˆik =(
a− b
(
zi + c(zk − zj)
2
+
zj + c(zk − zi)
2
+
1
3
))
·(
zi + c(zk − zj)
2
+
1
6
)
+(
a− b
(
zi + c(zj − zk)
2
+
zk + c(zj − zi)
2
+
1
3
))
·(
zi + c(zj − zk)
2
+
1
6
)
=(
a− b
3
)(
zi +
1
3
)
− b(3c− 1)
2
(
zk
(
zi + c(zk − zj)
2
+
1
6
)
+
zj
(
zi + c(zj − zk)
2
+
1
6
))
=
b(3c− 1)
4
z2i +
12a+ b(3c− 5)
12
zi +
3a− b
9
− bc(3c− 1)
4
(zk − zj)2 (6.5.2)
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Let m = 3k(c+ 1)/2, then zi(t) = ziemt. So,
Vi(z) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δtpii(yˆ(z(t)))dt =∫ ∞
0
e−δt
(
b(3c− 1)
4
(
zie
mt
)2
+
12a+ b(3c− 5)
12
zie
mt+
3a− b
9
− bc(3c− 1)
4
(
zke
mt − zjemt
)2)
dt =
b(3c− 1)
4
1
δ − 2mz
2
i +
12a+ b(3c− 5)
12
1
δ −mzi+
3a− b
9
1
δ
− bc(3c− 1)
4
1
δ − 2m(zk − zj)
2 (6.5.3)
Plugging in zi = xi − 13 and m = 3k(c+ 1)/2 gives precisely (6.4.10) and (6.4.11).
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Chapter 7
Selection Effects in Regulated
Markets
7.1 Introduction
Consider yourself arriving after a long trip at the railway station of your final destina-
tion. You know it is not too far to your hotel, but you want to take a taxi because of
your luggage and because of the fatigue. Taxis are standing in line and have regulated
non-negotiable fees. You walk up to the first taxi waiting in line and after hearing where
you want to be taken, the driver tells you that you better walk because he refuses to
take on passengers for such a short distance. As an economist, you may wonder: is
this rational behaviour on the part of the taxi driver? If so, what is the role of the fare
structure and does a fare structure exists where potential passengers are not refused?
Can it be socially optimal that potential passengers are refused?
There are a certain number of elements that are crucial to the above example. First,
consumers arrive sequentially to demand some service and come in different treatment
times or “complexities”. In the taxi example: different passengers have different travel
destinations and thus require different travel time. Second, the fare structure (how
price depends on treatment time or “complexity”) is fixed by a regulating authority
or central company management. In the taxi example: in different countries around
the world, taxi drivers are not free to determine their own fare structure, but the fare
structure is centrally programmed in the taxi meter. Third, agents who actually provide
the service can either accept or reject customers based on comparison of benefits and
costs. In the taxi example: taxi drivers are “free” to tell potential clients that they
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do not take them.1 It is optimal for a taxi driver to refuse a passenger if the expected
discounted revenue of waiting for the next passenger (the chance of getting “ big fish”)
is larger than the revenue of taking the current passenger and waiting before a next
passenger can be taken on. This, of course, assumes that the taxi driver receives at
least a part of the revenue of the ride.
The taxi market is not the only market where these features are present. In many
countries, many parts of the medical sector also satisfy the main features outlined above.
First, patients demanding some treatment enter a hospital or private clinic sequentially.
Second, medical doctors are not free to set their own fees, but instead the fees per
treatment are set by government authorities. Finally, medical doctors can refuse to
take on patients and send them to other hospitals sometimes giving the argument that
other doctors are better equipped to provide the proper treatment. Instead of selection,
one may also observe what is called demand inducement in health care markets where
medical doctors provide either more or a different treatment than what would be socially
optimal for a patient with a particular disease. The phenomenon of demand inducement
is of the same nature as the selection that appears in taxi markets: it exists because
the provider prefers to deal with a different type of customer than the one they actually
face. Though taxi drivers cannot induce demand (there is no possibility of bringing
the customer to some other location), for medical doctors it is possible to provider
some unnecessary treatment. Since demand inducement by its nature is similar to
selection, it can also be studied as part of our general framework. Other markets that
have features that are described above include the market for social attorneys2 and
some repair markets (shoes, electronics) where prices for standard repairs are set at the
central management level and franchise holders bear the revenues and costs.
In this chapter we analyze markets that are characterized by the three features
mentioned above. The underlying idea of our analysis is the fact that both selection
and demand inducement exist because the providers of the service prefer one type of
the customers to another (longer or shorter travel times, more or less severe illnesses).
We show that for a large class of price schedules, selection (or demand inducement) is
a crucial aspect of the equilibrium in these markets: depending on the price schedule
1A more official way to say this is that it is very difficult to enforce a system where taxi
drivers have to take all passengers.
2In quite a few countries, low income families can apply for legal aid (attorneys) at a
regulated fee. The fee structure has been modified recently in The Netherlands and this has
lead to selection effects as attorneys argued the fee structure is such that they cannot provide
legal aid to certain clients.
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either consumers with a low level of complexity or consumers with a high level of
complexity are refused. We then characterize the (class of) price structures for which
selection does not arise. These fare structures can be set a priori, i.e. the regulator
does not have to observe the complexity of particular customer. As the number of
customers increases or agents become more patient this class of selection-free price
structures shrinks and in the limit it is unique. We also show that selection is always
bad from a welfare point of view in the sense that for any price structure that gives
rise to selection, there exists another price structure without selection that generates a
higher total surplus.
To the best of our knowledge there are relatively few papers on selection effects in
regulated markets. There is, however, some literature on demand inducement in health
care markets, where the modeling and measurement of induced demand is one of the
main topics. This literature started with Evans (1974) who studied ”supply-induced
demand”. McGuire and Pauly (1991) studied the demand inducement problem un-
der regulated fees in a static setup and they characterized possible demand inducement
based on physician’s utility function (where intrinsic motivation also plays a role). They
studied physicians responses to changes in fees as well. The model is static, although
time is taken into account through the physician’s preference for leisure. Gruber and
Owings (1996) extended the model by introducing a parameter capturing overall de-
mand and supply conditions. Ellis and McGuire (1995) in their empirical paper study
selection and moral hazard problems in hospitals based on the reimbursement scheme
and created a panel date methodology for analysis of these effects. Ellis (1998) ana-
lyzed over-provision, under-provision of a service as well as an explicit avoidance of high
severity patients. He analyzed these effects in static model with transportation costs
and showed that cost-based payment schemes lead to over-provision of a service, while
lump-sum lead to under-provision and selection. Wright (2007) described selection
of the patients between public and private hospitals based on different fee structures.
The key difference of our setup is that we consider a dynamic model, which has two
main advantages. First, this allows us to avoid imposing too restrictive assumptions
on demand or supply sides of the market, selection arises naturally from intertemporal
considerations of the agents. Second, we show that selection (or demand inducement)
can be avoided even if agents are completely selfish (so they do not care about cus-
tomer benefits like in Ellis (1998) and some other papers), and they do not have any
reputation concerns. We also show that in the general model not only lump-sum price
structures (like in Ellis (1998)) lead to selection, but cost-base (linear) can lead to the
same outcome, but on the other side of the market, i.e. for low complexities.
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On taxi markets, there is some literature on the desirability of entry and price
regulation. Tullock (1975) and Williams (1980), among others, have argued in favour
of deregulation, basically using standard arguments on the welfare effects of perfect
competition. Proponents of regulation (such as Beesley (1973), Beesley (1979) and Teal
and Berglund (1987) have argued that due to the peculiarities of the taxi market, some
form of regulation may be necessary for a proper functioning of the market. Cairns
and Heyes (1996) also mention the rather mixed success with experimentation with
deregulation in some US cities in the 1980s leading those cities to back away from the
deregulation policy. Whatever one’s views on the (theoretical) desirability of regulating
the taxi market, fact is that most taxi markets around the globe are heavily regulated.
Cities as diverse in nature as New York, London, Tokyo, Amsterdam, Shanghai and
Singapore all have price structures which are regulated (see, e.g., Yang et al. (2004)).
Although every city has a structure with an initial charge and a distance-based charge,
the precise nature of the price structure differs from city to city.1 What is striking is
that certainly for smaller distances, almost all price structures are linear in distance.
In some cities the price proportional to distance becomes lower, if distance is beyond
a certain threshold. In this chapter we show that such price structures always lead to
selection of some customers. Glazer and Hassin (1983) were first who analyzed selection
and cheating in the taxi market and derived cheat proof prices, their results can be
obtained as a particular case of our model given two types of customers and specific
assumptions on relation between processing time and equilibrium level of selection.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes in de-
tail the general model of selection we are analyzing in some detail. Section 3 presents
the main results for generic price structures. Section 4 extends the analysis to study
demand inducement effects where suppliers have the possibility of giving consumers a
treatment that is different from the socially most optimal treatment given their com-
plexity. Section 5 briefly analyzes the case where the arrival rate of customers follows
a Poisson process. Section 6 concludes.
7.2 General Model
Consider a market where a consumer arrives and demands some service in each certain
time interval ∆t. Assume each consumer is characterized by a level of complexity θ
which is randomly distributed over the interval [θmin, θmax], with distribution F (θ).
1In addition, the fare may depend on delay-based charges, and additional week-end or night
charges.
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A customer of complexity θ derives a utility u(θ) from a service and a customer’s
reservation utility is normalized to 0. The market is (centrally) regulated, which means
that the price structure per unit g(θ) is fixed by a central authority or by central
management. Note, that the central authority does not observe the complexity θ of
a particular customer; it just sets up a complete price structure for any θ. There
are N (sufficiently large to meet the demand) agents who provide the service and in
the basic model they simply decide whether or not to accept a customer on the basis
of expected costs and benefits. This decision takes place after the customer reveals
the information about his complexity θ. Sometimes it is more beneficial for the agent
not to take the first customer, but to wait for the next one. For simplicity, agents
have infinite planning horizons and maximize the expected present value of future cash
flows. Payment is made just at the moment when the customer is accepted. It is not
possible for agents to influence the price structure. There are material costs per c(θ)
and the time to treat a consumer of complexity θ is given by t(θ). The time cost implies
that when a consumer is accepted no other consumer can be treated during the time
period t(θ). We define f(θ) = g(θ)− c(θ) to be the net price. We assume that for any
θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] f(θ) > 0 to exclude trivial selection cases.
Obviously for some price structures it can be the case that it is more profitable
to refuse a customer now, and to wait for the next one. In general it is possible that
multiple groups of customers are excluded due to selection, but there is a subcase that
is of particular interest, namely where selection is monotone. We say that selection
is monotone if it is not the case that a customer with complexity θ1 is accepted and
both customers with θ0 < θ1 and θ2 > θ1 are not accepted. Though the analysis below
is applicable to the more general case where selection is not monotone, monotone
selection allows us to simplify notation as it can be characterized by a unique cut-
off level θa for which either all customers with smaller or larger complexities are not
accepted (so we can parameterize selection). In case of low-θ selection, we get that
the support of Φ(θ; θa) is [θa; θmax], where θa is the lowest accepted complexity and
Φ(θ; θa) =
F (θ)−F (θa)
1−F (θa) . For high-θ selection, we obtain that the support of Φ(θ; θa) is
[θmin; θa], where θa is the highest accepted complexity and Φ(θ; θa) =
F (θ)
F (θa)
.
If there is selection, the probability that an agent faces an acceptable customer each
period is p(θa) which is equal 1 − F (θa) for the low-selection case and F (θa) for the
high-selection case.
We assume that the objective function of agents is their discounted expected value
of future cash flows conditional on θ: v(θ).1 The unconditional expected value of future
1We abstract from discussions whether providers are also lead by different considerations,
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Figure 7.1: The decision tree of the service provider
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cash flows we denote by V . It is important to emphasize that the value of V , which
is the value prior to the moment when an agent knows the complexity of a particular
customer, should be distinguished from the value of the process after this complexity
is revealed. This latter value is v(θ) and can be either larger or smaller than V . The
discount factor δ is assumed to be the same for all agents. As the model horizon
is infinite and each time the agent has to make a decision whether or not to take a
customer he faces the same situation, V has to be constant over time.
In case of monotone selection, the agent’s decision-making problem can be presented
as in the tree on the Figure 7.1.
Once the agent knows the particular θ of a customer, he can either accept or reject
the customer. If he accepts, he receives the price f(θ) from the customer and some
expected continuation value. If he rejects the customer, he faces an acceptable customer
with probability p(θa) in the next period, or he has to wait until the next period after
that which gives him discounted value V . In an equilibrium with selection, the agent
compares the value of accepting a customer now f(θ) + δt(θ,θa)V with the expected
value of waiting, which equals
p(θa)
[
δ∆tEΦ(f(θ) + δt(θ,θa)V )
]
+ (1− p(θa)) δ2∆tV.
If the pricing structure is such that every consumer is provided the service, then the
agent should at least weakly better off by taking the consumers. As we will see, this
invokes some restrictions on the parameters of the model.
such as the health of their patients or the socially optimal level of service. We only say that if
the provider is indifferent between providing any type of service, he will choose to provide the
optimal service.
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7.3 Analysis
We are now ready to proceed with the analysis of the model. We first consider situations
where every consumer is provided the service and then consider the case when selection
may occur.
7.3.1 Full participation case
We now first characterize the (class of) price structure(s) that is such that all customers
participate in equilibrium. Note, that in case of full participation p(θa) = 1 so that the
continuation value V is defined by:
V = E(f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ), (7.3.1)
where t(θ, ∅) is just a t(θ, θa) in case there is no selection.
Full participation means that agents have no incentives to reject customers. There-
fore, for any θ from the support of F (θ) we must have:
f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ≥ δ∆tV (7.3.2)
where V is defined above.
Thus, we can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 7.3.1. A price structure f(θ) insures full participation of customers if
and only if equations (7.3.1),(7.3.2) hold for f(θ).
In general for a given price structure f(θ), agents may still prefer one type of
customer to another even if all customers are taken. But since ∆t is some finite number,
the agents still have no incentives to reject any consumer as the customer with the least
profitable θ now is better than a costumer with an average θ later.
A particular case of an optimal price structure is when agents are purely indifferent
between the customers, which means that even if ∆t goes to 0, selection does not arise
in a market equilibrium. We define this particular price structure in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.3.2. The tariff structure that makes agents indifferent between cus-
tomers and thereby eliminating selection is defined by:
f∗(θ) = V (1− δt(θ,∅)) (7.3.3)
where V is continuation value.
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Figure 7.2: Agent’s pay-off under different price structures
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Proof. Since agents are indifferent among the customers, the value must be constant
in θ and equal to the expected value V . Thus, the equation
V = f∗(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V (7.3.4)
must hold for any θ as an identity. Therefore,
f∗(θ) = V (1− δt(θ,∅)). (7.3.5)
Now we need to check conditions (7.3.1) and (7.3.2). For (7.3.1) we obtain:
V = E
(
V (1− δt(θ,∅)) + δt(θ,∅)V
)
= V (7.3.6)
For (7.3.2) we obtain:
V (1− δt(θ,∅)) + δt(θ,∅)V = V > δ∆tV (7.3.7)
which completes the proof.
Note that the value of V is not determined here – it is a free parameter determining
the level of prices in the model and we can assign any arbitrary value to it.
We summarize our results so far by means of the following graph (see Figure 7.2).
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The expectation of v(θ) for all prices must be equal to V . For the price structure
f∗(θ) we have that v(θ) is a constant, i.e., v(θ) = V . Price structure A does not
imply a constant value: agents prefer customers with lower complexity. But given the
waiting time ∆t it is still optimal to accept all the customers. If the arrival frequency
of customers increases this price can induce high-complexity selection. Price structure
B induces low-complexity selection: customers with θ lower than θBa are not accepted.
price structure C leads to selection from the top, all customers with complexity higher
than θCa are not accepted.
7.3.2 Dynamic Selection at busy places: general case
A natural question to ask is what will happen at busy places, where the time that
elapses between consecutive customers arriving is very small. Analytically, we analyze
situations where ∆t is arbitrarily small. We will show that in this case, all selection-free
price structures are sufficiently close to f∗(θ), i.e., price structures that are significantly
different from the price structure where agents are indifferent between any of the cus-
tomers lead to selection.
To this end, we first introduce the class of selection-free price structures. Since the
value V determines the level of prices, we consider structures with the same V . Let
FV (δ,∆t) be the class of all price structures such that the following three requirements
are met:
• for any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) there is full participation in the market, i.e. condition
(7.3.2) is satisfied for all θ in the support of the distribution;
• any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) gives to the agent the expected value V ;
• for any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) and all θ u(θ) > f(θ).
We assume that for all customers the utility derived from a service is large enough
so that at least f∗(θ) is in FV (δ,∆t), and hence, so that FV (δ,∆t) is not empty. With
this definition, we can state the following proposition.1
Proposition 7.3.3. For any  > 0 there is a ∆t∗ such that for any ∆t<∆t∗ all
selection-free price structures defined on [θmin, θmax] are -close to the optimal one,
i.e. satisfy the following two conditions:
1A similar proposition can be proven for the case where the discount factor δ goes to 1. To
economize on space, this proposition is not included in the text.
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1. f∗(θ)− f(θ) < ;
2.
∫ θmax
θmin
|f∗(θ)− f(θ)|dF (θ) < 2(θmax − θmin).
Proof. 1. Recall, that by definition
f∗(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V = V
for all θ in the support of F (θ). Also note, that since f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) we have
that for all θ
f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ≥ δ∆tV.
By taking difference we obtain
f∗(θ)− f(θ) ≤ (1− δ∆t)V
then by choosing ∆t∗ = ln(1−

V
)
ln δ for any ∆t < ∆t
∗ we get that
f∗(θ)− f(θ) < 
which proves the first part of the proposition.
2. To prove the second part recall, that since both price structures belong to
FV (δ,∆t) we have
Ef∗(θ) + V Eδt(θ,∅) = V
Ef(θ) + V Eδt(θ,∅) = V
and therefore
∫ θmax
θmin
[f∗(θ)− f(θ)]dF (θ) = 0 (7.3.8)
Let A+ be a set of all θ in the support of distribution, such that f∗(θ) ≥ f(θ),
and A− be a set such that f∗(θ) < f(θ), A+
⋃
A− = [θmin, θmax]. Then
∫ θmax
θmin
|f∗(θ)− f(θ)|dF (θ) =
∫
A+
[f∗(θ)− f(θ)]dF (θ)−
∫
A−
[f∗(θ)− f(θ)]dF (θ)
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From (7.3.8) we get
0 =
∫
A+
[f∗(θ)− f(θ)]dF (θ) +
∫
A−
[f∗(θ)− f(θ)]dF (θ)
Therefore, by taking the difference and using the first part of the proposition we
obtain:
∫ θmax
θmin
|f∗(θ)− f(θ)|dF (θ) = 2
∫
A+
[f∗(θ)− f(θ)]dF (θ) < 2(θmax − θmin)
Intuitively, when ∆t becomes arbitrarily small, the cost of waiting for the next
customer vanishes as well and waiting gives you the expected continuation pay-off.
In this case, the only price structure that does not give rise to selection is the one
where every complexity yields (approximately) the same revenue (which is equal to the
expected value). This is exactly how the price structure f∗(θ) is characterized.
It is interesting to next investigate the welfare issues arising from selection. Our
analysis shows that from the point of view of social welfare price structures with full
participation are better than structures inducing selection.
We define social welfare as the sum of consumer and producer (agents) surplus.
Producer surplus is simply equal to the discounted value of future pay-offs for the
agents multiplied by the number of agents in the market. Each consumer has a utility
of u(θ) − f(θ) per service taken, which is his or her surplus. Integrating over all
consumers (or over all services taken by consumers) that are accepted in equilibrium
we arrive at the expected consumer surplus. So social welfare conditional on V is given
by:
SW (V ) = N · V +M
∫
SΦ
(u(θ)− f(θ))dF (θ) (7.3.9)
where SΦ is the support of the distribution under selection andM is some weighting
parameter. Integration over SΦ implies that we calculate surplus only for the customers
who are accepted in equilibrium, since the others receive their reservation utility, which
is zero.
Proposition 7.3.4. Consider a tariff structure g(θ) which induces selection, and de-
livers value V to the agents. Then any f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t) yields social welfare that is
larger than under g(θ).
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Proof. Consider some f(θ) ∈ FV (δ,∆t). Since both fare structures g(θ) and f(θ) deliver
value V to the agents, producer surplus equals NV in both cases. On the other hand,
under fare structure g(θ) less customers participate in the market. Therefore to provide
the same V they must pay on average more:∫
SΦ
f(θ)dF (θ) <
∫
SΦ
g(θ)dF (θ). (7.3.10)
Let W be consumer surplus. Then, using (7.3.10) we obtain:
W (f(θ)) =
∫ θmax
θmin
(u(θ)− f(θ))dF (θ) >
∫
SΦ
(u(θ)− f(θ))dF (θ) >
>
∫
SΦ
(u(θ)− g(θ))dF (θ) =W (g(θ))
. (7.3.11)
Since agents’ surplus is constant, it follows that social welfare is larger in the full
participation case for any positive value of M .
Whether or not the socially optimal price is necessarily also a Pareto-improvement
depends on the consumers processing time function. Indeed, for the optimal price
structure f∗(θ) we have:
f∗(θ) = (1− δt(θ,∅))V. (7.3.12)
For a price structure with selection at θa we have:
g(θa) = (δ∆t − δt(θ,θa))V. (7.3.13)
Note, that if t(θ, ∅) is quite close to t(θ, θa) (e.g. when consumer processing time
is exogenous) customers with θ close to θa are better off under g(θ). Thus, if each
customer has a fixed level of service complexity θ, then the optimal price structure may
not be Pareto-optimal. However, if consumers’ complexities vary in time so that each
customer is interested in expected surplus rather than surplus generated for a particular
value of θ, then the price that maximizes social welfare is also Pareto-improving.
7.4 Demand Inducement
The framework developed so far also allows us to analyze the demand inducement (or
moral hazard) problem which can arise in health care markets. A medical doctor is, in
principle, able to provide a customer of complexity θ with some other service θ0 as no
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Figure 7.3: Decision tree under demand inducement
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one apart from him knows the exact value of θ. This problem of ”demand inducement”
can be analyzed in our framework as follows.
Assume the agent, say a medical doctor, can provide the customer with the level
of service which is not required by his complexity. For example, he can prescribe some
extra (unnecessary) treatment. If the customer (and the regulator who determines
the price structure) does not know the true level of complexity, payment for this (un-
necessary) treatment is made. We assume that pure fraud (reporting that a certain
treatment is given while this is actually not the case) is not possible: if the true value is
θ and the agent decides to provide service with level of complexity θ0, then the required
treatment time is t(θ0, θa) and the payment to the service provider is given by the net
price f(θ0). Thus, the agent can substitute the true θ with θ0 but then it is necessary
to perform the treatment that is required by θ0 and he is payed for that.
It is clear that if there is a possibility for moral hazard the option “do not accept”
is no longer relevant to the agent: a medical doctor can always treat the customer as
the best customer from his perspective. We denote the level of complexity of this best
customer as θ0 ∈ Argmaxθ(f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ). Then, the decision tree of the agent looks
as presented on Figure 7.3.
Thus, the agent can either accept the customer and treat him truthfully or cheat
(we skip non-optimal ways of cheating since they are dominated by θ0). Note, that the
processing time is t(θ, ∅) or t(θ0, ∅) which indicates that in the equilibrium of the model
with the possibility of demand inducement the equilibrium level of selection is zero as
the agents can always take on the costumer and provide a treatment that yields the
highest possible pay-off.
The next Proposition argues that under the optimal price structure, the agent does
not have an incentive to induce extra demand.
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Proposition 7.4.1. Under the optimal price structure 7.3.3 there is no pair (θ, θ0)
from the support of F (θ) such that θ0 is better for the agents than θ.
Proof. Recall, that the optimal fare structure is defined by
f∗(θ) = V (1− δt(θ,∅))
Then the expected value of the service process for any θ after it has been observed
is defined by:
f∗(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V = (1− δt(θ,∅))V + δt(θ,∅)V = V = f∗(θ0) + δt(θ0,∅)V (7.4.1)
Thus, the optimal price structure f∗(θ) we characterize allows to avoid both selec-
tion and moral hazard (demand inducement) problems in regulated markets. Given
the optimal price structure, service providers are indifferent between providing (and
getting paid for) any possible treatment and so they do not have an incentive to cheat.
If they have a slight preference for given the optimal socially efficient treatment they
will do so.
7.5 Stochastic arrival process
So far, we have studied the case where in any given time interval, only one potential
costumer arrives. In this section we show that our results are robust to the case where
customers arrive according to a Poisson process instead of having one customer arriving
at a particular moment in time. To this end, assume ∆t is now distributed according
to an exponential distribution with parameter λ. Self-selection of customers leads to
a decrease in the intensity of the Poisson process: if p(θa) is the fraction of customers
that is taken in a selection equilibrium, then the intensity parameter of the arrival
process equals λ(θa) = λp(τa). This means that the average waiting time until the next
customer comes is 1λp(θa) .
Taxi drivers form expectations concerning the arrival time of the next customer.
To derive the optimal decision-making rule for drivers we need the following result.
Lemma 7.5.1. If x is exponentially distributed, then
Eδax =
λ
λ− a ln δ (7.5.1)
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Proof. Indeed,
E = δax =
∫ ∞
0
λδate−λtdt =
∫ ∞
0
λe(a ln δ−λ)tdt =
λ
λ− a ln δ (7.5.2)
Now we can apply this result to all previous sections. To do so we just need to
replace a predetermined discount factor δa∆t by the expected discount factor λλ−a ln δ .
Then we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 7.5.2. The price structure f∗(θ) ensures full participation of customers
if and only if:
V = E(f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ) (7.5.3)
and
f(θ) + δt(θ,∅)V ≥ λ
λ− ln δV. (7.5.4)
The optimal price structure is not affected by changing the arrival process, therefore
Proposition 7.3.2 still holds, and the price structure which ensures full participation for
any value of the intensity λ is given by:
f∗(θ) = V (1− δt(θ,∅)).
For an arbitrary net price structure f(θ), which leads to selection, the lowest (high-
est) accepted type is defined by the following equation:
f(θa) + δt(θ,θa)V = p(θa)
λ
λ− ln δEΦ(f(θ) + δ
t(θ,θa)V )+
+(1− p(θa)) λ
λ− 2 ln δV
, (7.5.5)
which corresponds to (7.3.2) (put as equality) in the non-stochastic case.
Finally, since the proof of proposition 7.3.4 is invariant with respect to the nature of
∆t the price structure (7.3.3) is still socially optimal under stochastic customer arrival
conditions.
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have analyzed dynamic selection effects that arise in some regulated
markets. Our framework applies when three core conditions are satisfied: (i) consumers
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arrive sequentially at some moments of time (a stochastic arrival process is also possible)
and differ in their types (complexity of service required); (ii) price structures, with price
depending on the level of complexity of a costumer, are fixed by a regulator or another
authority or by central management and (iii) agents (providers of the service) can
either accept or reject the customers based on a comparison of benefits and costs (or,
in an extension, can decide to give a different treatment).
We have shown that for a large class of fare structures customers with a low level
of complexity or customers with a high level of complexity are refused the service.
Equilibria with selection are welfare inferior to equilibria without selection. We have
characterized the class of price structures for which selection does not arise. For markets
with very many customers, this price structure is unique up to a scaling factor. The
optimal price structure also prevents moral hazard to arise if service providers can
induce demand (as in the medical sector).
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Conclusions
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part analyses different issues of consumer
search, and the part analyses competition and regulation in dynamic settings.
Chapter 2 studies the implication of the introduction of a costly second visits (costly
recall) assumption on the optimal consumer search rule. We propose a model which
explicitly takes the costs of going back into account. We show that the reservation price
(i) depends on the number of firms left in the sample, and (ii) depends on the search
history (the best price found so far). We show that consumers accept higher prices in
the latter rounds of search, i.e. when the number of firms left decreases. We also show
that the reservation price is a non-decreasing function of the best price searched. Thus,
the optimal search rule implies that prices rejected in the first round of search might
be acceptable in subsequent rounds. A notable property of the optimal search rule is
that consumers never come back to the sampled store till they learn all the prices in
the market. The results of this chapter can be applied to equilibrium settings, say in a
model similar to Stahl (1989) or other settings.
Chapter 3 takes the first step towards applying the results of the first chapter.
We show that though consumers’ strategies can be very complicated, all the potential
complexity in the outcome boils down to the usual results under perfect recall due
to the equilibrium strategies employed by the firms. We show that the equilibrium
defined in Stahl (1989) is still an equilibrium in a model with costly second visits.
Moreover, this is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the model. Thus, uninformed
consumers always stop at the first store. However, the result of this chapter must
be interpreted with caution. We show that the perfect recall and costly second visits
equilibria coincide in this particular industry setup. This might not be true for other
setups, either monopolistic competition (e.g. Anderson and Renault (1999)) or even
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somewhat different oligopolistic setups (e.g. Chapter 4).
Chapter 4 looks at implications of minimum price guarantees (MPGs) for consumer
markets. For our analysis we use the conventional sequential consumer search frame-
work developed by Stahl (1989). We concentrate on the case when MPGs are not
preannounced, i.e. the fact whether MPGs are set or not is revealed simultaneously
with the price observation. The main part of the chapter focuses on price-matching
strategies. We show, that due to the free-rider problem it is not possible that all firms
set MPGs for sure. There are two equilibria in the model: when MPGs are never set,
and when MPGs are played with a certain positive probability. The latter exists only
if there is a sufficiently high level of consumer interaction which translates into a rela-
tively high chance of exercising MPGs. In the equilibrium with MPGs prices are higher
than in the equilibrium without it. We see further research in (i) empirical application
of the results of the chapter, (ii) analysis of the case with preannounced MPGs in the
similar setting.
Chapter 5 concentrates on investigating a particular object’s properties of and their
interdependence. We show that objects which are ex ante identical in terms of expected
utility and risk might be evaluated very differently given the possibility of investigating
the attributes. Asymmetry in the probability distribution over the characteristics,
which is seemingly irrelevant, plays an important role in consumer behaviour. The
optimal search rule is such that the searcher first observes an attribute which is least
likely to take an acceptable value. We show that sometimes a sufficiently high level of
asymmetry can induce search, which is not observed when the attributes are (almost)
symmetric. This result provides interesting grounds for further research: can firms
benefit from the fact that even though consumers have ex ante negative utility of
buying the good, they might start to search?
In chapter 6, we consider a dynamic (differential) game with three players competing
against each other. In each period, each player can allocate his resources so as to direct
his competition towards particular rivals – we call such competition selective. The key
feature of selective competition is that the power of the players changes with time based
upon their actions. This brings an important strategic consideration into the game:
players might want to target particular opponents and reduce the level of competition
with others in order to influence the balance of powers. We show that if the players are
myopic, the weaker players eventually lose the game to their strongest rival. Vice versa,
if the players value their future payoffs high enough, each player concentrates more on
fighting his strongest opponent. Consequently, the weaker players grow stronger, the
strongest player grows weaker and eventually all the players converge and remain in
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the game. We leave two questions for further research: (i) what happens if there
are more players in the game; (ii) how do the results of the model change if we in a
stochastic rather than deterministic setting? The strategic considerations emphasized
in this chapter create a field for future research in different applied settings.
In chapter 7, we analyse markets with regulated price structures, for example taxi
markets, doctors’ services, some repair markets. These markets quite often are charac-
terized either by selection or by demand inducement. We show that for a large class of
price structures some group of customers is refused the service. Equilibria with selection
are welfare inferior to equilibria without selection. We characterize the class of price
structures for which selection does not arise. As the number of customers increases
or agents become more patient, the class of selection-free price structures shrinks and
in the limit it is unique. Moreover, all other price structures induce selection. We
show that this unique fare structure not only avoids the selection problem, but also
eliminates demand inducement. The results of this chapter can be directly applied to
policy-making decisions in regulated markets.
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